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I. INTRODUCTION
The Republican Party’s national platform of 1860 is useful for
interpreting the Fourteenth Amendment of the United States
Constitution, which was written just six years later by a Republican1
controlled Congress. That platform, however, has frequently been
2
overlooked or misunderstood. In particular, the due process plank
of the platform has often been portrayed as supporting the doctrine
3
called “substantive due process.” A close look at the platform,
though, shows that it did not actually support that doctrine, and
instead refutes it.
In Chicago during May of 1860, on the brink of the Civil War,
4
the Republican Party held its second national convention, and the
plank in question took the form of a resolution:
That the normal condition of all the territory of the United
States is that of freedom; That as our Republican fathers,
when they had abolished slavery in all our national territory,
ordained that “[sic] no persons should be deprived of life,
liberty or property, without due process of law,” it becomes our
duty, by legislation, whenever such legislation is necessary,
to maintain this provision of the Constitution against all
attempts to violate it; and we deny the authority of
Congress, of a territorial legislature, or of any individuals, to
give legal existence to slavery in any Territory of the United

1

See U.S. CONST. amend. XIV; National Republican Platform (May 17, 1860) in
KIRK PORTER & DONALD JOHNSON, NATIONAL PARTY PLATFORMS, 1840–1964, at 30–32
(1966).
2
See Howard Jay Graham, Procedure to Substance—Extra-Judicial Rise of Due Process,
1830–1860, 40 CALIF. L. REV. 483, 493 (1952): “That historians—both general and
constitutional—have almost completely ignored the party platform as a source for
understanding the Fourteenth Amendment itself testifies to serious oversights and
misconceptions.” This remains true.
3
See, e.g., MARK GRABER, DRED SCOTT AND THE PROBLEM OF CONSTITUTIONAL EVIL
62–63 (2006); EDWARD CORWIN, LIBERTY AGAINST GOVERNMENT: THE RISE, FLOWERING
AND DECLINE OF A FAMOUS JUDICIAL CONCEPT 114 (1948); Louise Weinberg,
Overcoming Dred: A Counterfactual Analysis, 24 CONST. COMMENT. 733, 762 (2007);
Richard Aynes, Unintended Consequences of the Fourteenth Amendment and What They Tell
Us About its Interpretation, 39 AKRON L. REV. 289, 300 (2006); Robert J. Reinstein,
Completing the Constitution: The Declaration of Independence, Bill of Rights and Fourteenth
Amendment, 66 TEMP. L. REV. 361, 396 (1993).
4
NATIONAL PARTY CONVENTIONS, 1831–2000, at 24 (Cong. Q. ed., 2001). The
party’s first national convention was in Philadelphia during June of 1856. Id. at 49.
There had been a mass meeting in February of 1856 at Pittsburgh, but this should
not be considered a “convention,” because anyone could attend, not just delegates.
See WILLIAM GIENAPP, THE ORIGINS OF THE REPUBLICAN PARTY, 1852–1856, at 254
(1987).
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5

States.
Throughout this Article, I will call this the due process “plank,” and
will only use the term “Due Process Clause” with reference to the
Constitution. At first sight, this plank looks something like an
assertion that slavery violated substantive due process, but that
6
conclusion is incorrect and rests only upon faulty inference.
By its terms, this plank of the platform addressed liberty in free
federal “territory,” rather than in areas like the District of Columbia
7
where substantive due process would have applied equally. Even the
most prominent and ardent abolitionists recognized that this plank
offered no opposition to federal support of slavery in the District of
8
Columbia. Congress largely stopped supporting slavery in 1862, but
9
not because of any substantive penumbra of the Due Process Clause.
In his first inaugural address, Abraham Lincoln said that the
Republican Party’s platform, which had been adopted at their 1860
10
convention, was like “a law to themselves and to me.” Few sources
were as widely publicized and broadly representative as this platform,
which makes it a very good indicator of public meaning.
Consider briefly the big picture. In 1791, the Fifth Amendment
was ratified, declaring that the nation would deprive no one of “life,
5

See PORTER & JOHNSON, supra note 1, at 32 (emphasis added). This plank was
the platform’s eighth resolution or “declaration.” Id. The first internal quote mark
was misplaced, and belonged after the word “should” because the Fifth Amendment
does not include that word. See U.S. CONST. amend. V. Some versions of the 1860
platform omit the internal quote marks altogether. See, e.g., Downes v. Bidwell, 182
U.S. 244, 297 n.11 (1901) (White, J., concurring) (this footnote in Justice White’s
concurring opinion recites the 1860 due process plank without any internal quote
marks; it is the second footnote on page 297, and so is sometimes numbered “2” even
though it is the eleventh footnote in White’s opinion). See generally infra Kasson
Papers, note 98 (draft platform is in Iowa archives).
6
See EMERSON DAVID FITE, THE PRESIDENTIAL CAMPAIGN OF 1860, at 124 (1911).
7
See, e.g., 4 DAVID CURRIE, THE CONSTITUTION IN CONGRESS: DESCENT INTO THE
MAELSTROM, 1829–1861, at 12 (2005) (“It had long been assumed . . . that various Bill
of Rights provisions applied” in the District).
8
For example, Frederick Douglass protested the omission of the District from
the 1860 platform. See FREDERICK DOUGLASS: SELECTED SPEECHES AND WRITINGS 410
(Philip Foner & Yuval Taylor eds., 1999). So did William Lloyd Garrison. See
Theodore Lockwood, Garrison and Lincoln the Abolitionist, 6 THE ABRAHAM LINCOLN
QUARTERLY 199, 208 (1950).
9
Congress first banned slavery in the District. See Act of Apr. 16, 1862, ch. 54,
12 Stat. 376. Then Congress banned slavery in the territories. See Act of July 1, 1862,
ch. 119, 12 Stat. 432; ERIC FONER, THE FIERY TRIAL: ABRAHAM LINCOLN AND AMERICAN
SLAVERY 203 (2011).
10
Abraham Lincoln, Inaugural Address (March 4, 1861) in RICHARD GILDER AND
DANIEL FISH, 6 COMPLETE WORKS OF ABRAHAM LINCOLN, 169–70 (1905). Cf. Letter of
Edward Bates to O.H. Browning, N.Y. TIMES, June 23, 1860, at 10 (belittling platforms).
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11

liberty, or property, without due process of law.” In 1868, this same
12
clause was applied to the states. Later, the United States Supreme
Court used this clause to rule on substance that was not enumerated
13
14
in the Constitution, such as English-only schools, abortion,
15
16
The Court has unanimously
grandparent visitation, and sex.
acknowledged that the substantive aspect of the Due Process Clause
“is suggested neither by its language nor by pre-constitutional
17
history.”
Yet they have forged ahead, believing, in the words of
Justice Anthony Kennedy, that “we must never fail to ask ourselves
18
not only what the law is, but what the law should be.” Defenders of
19
substantive due process cherish it, but the doctrine remains highly
disputed.
The term “substantive due process” was not in use before the
twentieth century, though the concept of substantive law has been
20
analytically useful for centuries. An intriguing article by Professor
11

U.S. CONST. amend. V.
U.S. CONST. amend. XIV.
13
See Bartels v. Iowa, 262 U.S. 404, 412–13 (1923); Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S.
390, 398–99 (1923).
14
See generally Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey, 505
U.S. 833 (1992); Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973). For present purposes, it makes
no difference whether the social results of these cases are wonderful or catastrophic.
15
See generally Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57 (2000).
16
See Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 578 (2003) (“Had those who drew and
ratified the Due Process Clauses of the Fifth Amendment or the Fourteenth
Amendment known the components of liberty in its manifold possibilities, they
might have been more specific.”). See generally infra note 210 (incorporating
enumerated rights against the states).
17
Regents of the Univ. of Mich. v. Ewing, 474 U.S. 214, 225–26 (1985) (citations
omitted). Justice Powell filed a concurring opinion but no justices dissented. Id. at
214.
18
Richard Reuben, Man in the Middle, CAL. LAW., Oct. 1992, at 35 (quoting
Anthony Kennedy). Cf. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137, 177 (1803).
19
See Timothy Sandefur, In Defense of Substantive Due Process, or the Promise of
Lawful Rule, 35 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 283, 318–20 (2012) (lauding the courts as a
barrier against the “representative body”). But see id. at 345 (claiming that federal
courts are themselves representative bodies).
20
See, e.g., 1 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 138
(First Edition, 1765). Blackstone distinguished substantive from procedural law:
Not only the substantial part, or judicial decisions, of the law, but also
the formal part, or method of proceeding, cannot be altered but by
parliament; for, if once those outworks were demolished, there would
be an inlet to all manner of innovation in the body of the law itself.
Id. This excerpt is often misquoted. See the errata after Blackstone’s Table of
Contents. Substantive and remedial law are also distinguishable. See, e.g., City of
Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 520 (1997) (“remedial, rather than substantive”). Not
only Blackstone, but also the antebellum United States Supreme Court, distinguished
12

HYMAN.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

2013]

1/9/2013 2:54 PM

THE DUE PROCESS PLANK

233

Ryan Williams in 2010 suggested that the Due Process Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment might affect substantive law even while the
21
identical clause in the Fifth Amendment does not. Williams cited
the 1860 due process plank as a reason for attributing substantive
22
content to the Due Process Clause in the Fourteenth Amendment.
Putting aside what effect a Republican endorsement of substantive
due process in 1860 would have had, such an endorsement did not
happen.
The 1860 plank deliberately omitted places like the District of
Columbia where slavery was common, because Republicans such as
Abraham Lincoln believed that federally enforced slavery was
23
constitutional there, albeit deplorable.
According to the 1860
Census, there was a much larger number of slaves in the District than
in the entire remainder of exclusive federal jurisdiction, including all
of the federal territories combined (putting aside slaves held by
24
Native American tribes).
Republicans in 1860 were primarily
attempting to stop the spread of slavery, as compared to uprooting
that oppressive system where it already existed, and prior to the Civil
War the Republican platform was one of containment rather than
25
abolition.
The word “territory” in the platform was used by Republicans in
its typical narrow sense, which excluded the individual states and
other areas like federal forts and dockyards. The “republican fathers”
had abolished slavery in the territories that were then in existence,
but had not abolished slavery within federal property throughout the
26
south, where slavery remained legal up to the Civil War. Given the
narrow use of the word “territory” in the due process plank, the
common understanding was that it did not include the District of
27
Columbia. Likewise, the phrase “give legal existence to slavery” in
“modes of proceeding” from other law. See infra text accompanying note 45. Before
the Civil War, the word “process” was often limited to procedural matters. See infra
note 53 (citing a legal dictionary).
21
Ryan C. Williams, The One and Only Substantive Due Process Clause, 120 YALE L. J.
408, 474 (2010).
22
Id. Cf. Frederick Gedicks, An Originalist Defense of Substantive Due Process, 58
EMORY L. J. 585, 590 (2009) (remarking that the “overwhelming” consensus is that
the Fifth Amendment’s clause is not substantive).
23
See infra notes 101–03 and accompanying text.
24
See infra notes 85, 86, and accompanying text.
25
See PAUL RONAN, HEROES, VILLAINS & DUPES: HOW THE ANTEBELLUM PRESIDENTS
ALLOWED SLAVERY TO DRIVE THE COUNTRY TO THE CIVIL WAR 163 (2010).
26
See FONER, supra note 9, at 203 (2011).
27
See, e.g., supra note 8 (views of abolitionists).
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the plank was widely understood as being applicable only to areas
(unlike the District) where slavery had not already attained legal
28
existence.
There is no reason to doubt that the 1860 plank used the
concept of “due process” in the traditional ancient manner of Magna
Carta, in order to insist that government officials can only deprive
29
people of liberty if the deprivation is authorized by law. Of course,
an act of Congress unauthorized by the Constitution is not law, and
therefore the U.S. Supreme Court explained in 1856 that a key test
of due process is to, “examine the [C]onstitution itself, to see
30
whether this process be in conflict with any of its provisions.”
Antebellum Republicans who disagreed about which constitutional
provisions collectively barred territorial slavery nevertheless agreed
that one of those provisions was the Due Process Clause, which
31
thereby served as a kind of lowest common denominator.
If the 1860 platform had employed due process in a substantive
way, then its logic would have applied to the District too, where
thousands of slaves resided. The fact that the due process plank did
not refer to or affect the District thus confirms that substantive due
process was not employed. The due process plank relied implicitly
upon other constitutional material to prevent slavery from spreading
where it did not already exist, in the same way that the plank was
inexplicit about the constitutional authority by which the
“Republican fathers” had abolished territorial slavery decades
32
earlier.
The 1860 due process plank mostly retained its form four years
after the 1856 convention, which shows considerable devotion to the
33
plank.
This part of the 1860 platform is often mistakenly cited
28

See, e.g., infra note 127 and accompanying text (Lyman Trumbull discusses this
distinction in Congress).
29
See Williams, supra note 21, at 434 (discussing interpretation of due process
and Magna Carta in eighteenth century Britain).
30
Den ex dem. Murray v. Hoboken Land & Imp. Co. (Murray’s Lessee), 59 U.S.
272, 277 (1856). This case was decided on February 19, 1856. See CHARLES WARREN,
THE SUPREME COURT IN UNITED STATES HISTORY 72 (1999). The first national
Republican convention occurred four months later. See supra note 4.
31
I am grateful to Eric Foner for suggesting that this mathematical analogy
could make the sentence clearer, via private communication.
32
See, e.g., U.S. CONST. art. IV. § 3 (“Congress shall have power to . . . make all
needful Rules and Regulations respecting the Territory or other Property belonging
to the United States. . . .”).
33
The 1860 plank is recited at text accompanying note 5 supra, and the 1856
plank is recited at text accompanying note 65 infra.
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nowadays as evidence that antebellum Republicans supported the
doctrine of substantive due process, and for that reason alone the
1860 platform is well worth considering in detail.
Properly
understood, the plank is impossible to reconcile with that doctrine.
To get a fuller sense of what the plank was about, it is necessary
to consider the political and legal background just before the Civil
War—that is the subject of Part II. Part III discusses how the plank
was written so as to avoid intra-party controversy, including
controversy about whether various other clauses of the Constitution
forbade slavery in the District of Columbia. Part IV presents evidence
that the plank refers only to areas where slavery lacked legal
existence, rather than to areas like the District of Columbia where
slavery already had legal existence. Part V describes the various
constitutional clauses that implicitly undergird the plank, other than
substantive due process, which the plank neither recognized nor
endorsed. Part VI discusses abolitionists’ criticisms of the 1860
platform, demonstrating that they were well aware that the District of
Columbia was omitted. Part VII addresses the use of hortatory rather
than mandatory language in the platform, such as use of the word
“should” instead of “shall.” Part VIII presents some brief conclusions.
II. POLITICAL AND LEGAL BACKGROUND
The due process plank was central to the 1860 Republican
platform, Abraham Lincoln pledged to uphold it, and he urged
34
fellow Republicans to stick to it.
In those days, presidential
candidates did not make speeches or actively campaign on their own
behalf, and therefore party platforms mattered much more than they
35
do now. When the southern states seceded, it was in large part a
reaction to the Republican policy implemented by the 1860 due
36
process plank.
Much of the federal government’s non-military
legislation in the 1860s was pursuant to provisions of the 1860
37
platform, which again shows that the platform was a seriously
impactful document, analogous in some ways to the Declaration of
Independence which it quoted. Four decades later, the 1860
34

See DAVID DONALD, LINCOLN 270 (1996).
See HAROLD HOLZER, LINCOLN PRESIDENT-ELECT 14–15, 26 (2008) (“Prevailing
political tradition called for silence from presidential candidates . . . in an era when
party platforms still very much mattered.”).
36
BRIAN FARMER, AMERICAN CONSERVATISM: HISTORY, THEORY, AND PRACTICE 171
(2005).
37
THE CONCISE PRINCETON ENCYCLOPEDIA OF AMERICAN POLITICAL HISTORY 179
(Michael Kazin et al. eds., 2011).
35
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platform was remembered this way:
The Republican party upon this platform entered and
fought its great battle for human liberty. Because it waged a
successful warfare it can hardly be said that the principles
for which it fought were overthrown in the contest. The
Republican party said the Constitution went to the
38
territories, and carried liberty with it.
The historical background of the due process plank is most
easily understood by keeping in mind four separate events. In 1856,
the Supreme Court decided its first major case about due process in
39
Murray’s Lessee v. Hoboken Land. Later that year, the first Republican
national convention was held in Philadelphia, resulting in a platform
that included a due process plank. Then, in 1857, the Court decided
a much more famous case involving due process: Dred Scott v.
40
Sandford.
Lastly, in 1860, the Republicans’ held their national
convention in Chicago, where they modified the due process plank of
four years earlier. The order of these four events is important, and
each is worth considering in more detail.
A. Murray’s Lessee Decision in February 1856
By 1856, the U.S. Supreme Court had said little about due
process. Several state courts had used due process clauses (or similar
“law of the land” clauses) of state constitutions to implement
substantive principles of generality, impartiality, vested rights, or
41
equality,
but those state court decisions met considerable

38

Charles E. Littlefield & J.B. Henderson, The Insular Cases, 15 HARV. L. REV. 281,
285 (1902).
39
Murray’s Lessee, 59 U.S. 272; Cf. Bloomer v. McQuewan, 55 U.S. 539, 553–54
(1853). Chief Justice Taney’s brief remarks in Bloomer about due process were dicta,
and moreover were correct; if Congress offers no compensation as required by the
Fifth Amendment, and then takes property contrary to the Takings Clause, then that
is a due process violation, but in a remedial rather than substantive sense. As the
Court would later correctly explain in 1856, a process is not due process of law if it
conflicts with any other provision of the Constitution. See Murray’s Lessee, 59 U.S. at
277.
40
Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. 393, 450 (1857).
41
When he introduced the Bill of Rights, Madison said that, “equality of
mankind . . . is an absolute truth, yet it is not absolutely necessary to be inserted at
the head of a Constitution.” 1 Annals of Congress 454 (June 8, 1789). But this
equality principle has been read into due process. See Bolling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497
(1954). Bolling could have and should have been decided on other grounds. See
MICHAEL MCCONNELL, WHAT BROWN V. BOARD OF EDUCATION SHOULD HAVE SAID 168
(Jack Balkin ed., 2001).
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42

resistance. Moreover, those state cases were decided in the context
of state constitutions, which were substantially different from the
federal one; the United States Constitution contains many distinctive
clauses that are relevant to interpretation of the Due Process Clause.
For example, the Supremacy Clause makes the “laws of the United
States” part of the “law of the land”; also, the provisions of the Bill of
Rights other than the Fifth Amendment are formulated as separate
amendments so that the states could choose to reject them
simultaneously with ratifying the Fifth Amendment. Additionally, the
Fugitive Slave Clause shows that the framers and ratifiers used the
words “due” and “law” even to accomplish what many of them
43
realized was unjust.
By 1856, there was not a single federal appellate substantive due
process case, which speaks to the difference between the
jurisprudence of the federal government as compared to the few state
judicial decisions that had embraced the doctrine.
Some
Republicans did substantively interpret the word “law” as limiting
44
what rules a legislature could enact. However, that was not remotely
the predominant antebellum view among Republicans or within the
45
country as a whole. If a legislative enactment met the definition of a
“rule,” then it was very widely considered to be a “law,” unless it
violated a constitutional provision.

42

See, e.g., Hoke v. Henderson, 15 N.C. 1 (1834), overturned by Mial v. Ellington,
134 N.C. 131 (1903). Hoke was the foremost such decision to date. See Williams,
supra note 21, at 461. Years later, judges agreed that Hoke “stands out in strong
contrast . . . to every published decision and opinion on the subject which we have
ever seen.” Conner v. Mayor of N.Y., 2 Sandf. 355, 373 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1849), aff’d 5
N.Y. 285 (1851). In 1843, a state court held that taking property for private roads
violated due process. See Taylor v. Porter, 4 Hill 140, 145–46 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1843).
That was overruled by constitutional change in 1846. See CHARLES MCCURDY, THE
ANTI-RENT ERA IN NEW YORK LAW AND POLITICS, 1839–1865, at 284 (2001). By 1856,
the leading state substantive due process case was Wynehamer v. People, 13 N.Y. 378,
392–93 (1856). Courts in twelve states rejected it, as would the federal courts, and
far fewer states accepted it than rejected it. See BERNARD STEINER, LIFE OF ROGER
BROOKE TANEY 415 n.154 (1922); Mugler v. Kansas, 123 U.S. 623, 657, 669 (1887).
43
See generally Andrew Hyman, The Little Word “Due”, 38 AKRON L. R. 1 (2005).
44
See, e.g., Giddings, infra note 121.
45
See infra notes 121 (Lincoln’s view) and 134 (McLean’s view); see also Ogden v.
Saunders, 25 U.S. 213, 347 (1827) (Marshall, C.J., dissenting); THE FEDERALIST No. 62
(James Madison) (“Law is defined to be a rule of action, but how can that be a rule
which is little known, and less fixed?”); WENDELL PHILLIPS, REVIEW OF LYSANDER
SPOONER’S ESSAY ON THE UNCONSTITUTIONALITY OF SLAVERY 7 (1847). In Ogden, Chief
Justice Marshall, joined by Justice Story, wrote that the word “law” is defined as, “a
rule of civil conduct prescribed by the supreme power in a state.” Ogden, 25 U.S. at
347. No justice disavowed that definition, which was a typical one. See id.
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The 1856 United States Supreme Court case of Murray’s Lessee v.
Hoboken Land cited several of the state court cases that had employed
substantive due process. But those state cases were cited only for the
procedural notion that due process “generally implies and includes
actor, reus, judex, regular allegations, opportunity to answer, and a
trial according to some settled course of judicial proceedings, yet this
46
is not universally true.”
Murray’s Lessee was the leading antebellum case about due
47
process, and was unanimous. This opinion described a test for
48
whether a process enacted by Congress is due process. The Court
said that the test “must be twofold,” rather than threefold or
49
fourfold. The twofold test in Murray’s Lessee was as follows:
To what principles, then, are we to resort to ascertain
whether this process, enacted by Congress, is due process?
To this the answer must be twofold. We must examine the
Constitution itself to see whether this process be in conflict
with any of its provisions. If not found to be so, we must
look to those settled usages and modes of proceeding
existing in the common and statue [sic] law of England,
before the emigration of our ancestors, and which are
shown not to have been unsuited to their civil and political
condition by having been acted on by them after the
50
settlement of this country.
Justice Benjamin R. Curtis spoke for the Court in Murray’s Lessee. The
substantive matter in the case was “recovery of balances due to the
government by a collector of customs,” and the procedural matter
was whether a summary method of collection would suffice without a
51
full trial. The Court held that the summary method “cannot be
denied to be due process of law” as applied to the corresponding
52
substantive matter of the case. There is no indication that the Court

46

Murray’s Lessee, 59 U.S. at 280 (citations omitted). See generally supra note 42
(discussing some of the state cases). See also infra note 57 (discussing what the
Murray’s Lessee Court meant when it said that due process “generally implies and
includes” various procedures). Notice that the due process plank only referenced
due process in the Fifth Amendment, rather than referencing any similar clauses in
state constitutions or state cases, and so the prevailing Republican understanding of
due process was evidently guided by the former more than the latter.
47
Murray’s Lessee, 59 U.S. 272.
48
Id. at 276–77.
49
Id.
50
Id.
51
Id. at 280.
52
Id.
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considered the substantive matter of the case to be part of the
53
“process.”
The first prong of the twofold test that the Court used in
Murray’s Lessee (“We must examine the Constitution itself . . .”) had a
firm foundation in the Fifth Amendment, given that the entire
54
United States Constitution is part of the law of the land. In this way,
the Due Process Clause helps to effectuate the rest of the
Constitution, not just by requiring that the executive branch refrain
from depriving people of liberty without authorization, but also by
requiring that Congress itself cannot give such authorization except
in the form of a law that respects all of the rights enshrined in the
Constitution.
The second Murray’s Lessee prong, which required the Court to
look at old English law that settlers had brought to America, suggests
that old processes would comply with due process, without forbidding
55
alternative new processes. Had the second Murray’s Lessee prong
categorically insisted upon old processes, then it would have lacked
the sort of firm foundation upon which the first prong rested, and
would have amounted to a straitjacket preventing legislative
56
innovation. Pursuant to its second prong, the Court in Murray’s
53

The word “process” in the Due Process Clause had often been defined
procedurally. See, e.g., JOHN BOUVIER, 2 A LAW DICTIONARY ADAPTED TO THE
CONSTITUTION AND LAWS OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA AND OF THE SEVERAL
STATES OF THE AMERICAN UNION 373 (2d Edition 1843) (defining “process” as the
“means or method of accomplishing a thing,” at the last full paragraph on the page).
54
See Murray’s Lessee, 59 U.S. at 277. The Court stated that the words “due
process of law” have the “same meaning” as the words by “the law of the land” in
Magna Carta. Id. at 276. Cf. JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION OF
THE UNITED STATES 663 (1833) (Due Process Clause is “an enlargement of the
language of Magna Carta”).
55
The Court later said that “it by no means follows” from the second Murray
Lessee’s prong that there can be no innovation. See Hurtado v. California, 110 U.S.
516, 528–29 (1884). The Hurtado Court claimed power to decide whether innovative
statutes are valid. Id. at 537. That claim covered both procedure and substance. Id.
at 533. Robert Yates foresaw that the Court would, “give such a meaning to the
constitution in all cases where it can possibly be done, as will enlarge the sphere of
their own authority.” Brutus, no. XI (January 31, 1788) in 2 THE COMPLETE ANTIFEDERALIST 419–21 (Storing ed., 1981).
56
Edward Coke said that “due process of law” is satisfied by following the “law of
the land,” which he defined in turn as “common law, statute law, or custom.” See
EDWARD COKE, THE SECOND PART OF THE INSTITUTES OF THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 45–46
(1797). Notice that Coke included “statute law.” According to Justice Scalia, Coke
believed that due process referred “to the customary procedures to which freemen
were entitled by ‘the old law of England.’” Pacific Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Haslip, 499
U.S. 1, 28 (1991) (Scalia, J., concurring). Indeed, Coke said that the words “due
process” in a certain act were “declaratory of the old law of England.” See COKE,
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Lessee listed several procedural features, and said that due process
57
Like the seventeenth“generally implies and includes” them.
century writings of the eminent English jurist Edward Coke (which
the Court cited), the second Murray’s Lessee prong did not preclude
58
statutory innovation.
That second prong basically counseled a
review of history to see how similar matters had been handled in the
past. Even if the second Murray’s Lessee prong had purported to
59
prevent any statutory innovation, still it applied to procedure rather
than substance, which is evidenced by the second prong’s
60
requirement that “modes of proceeding” must be considered.
After describing its twofold test, the Court in Murray’s Lessee
61
proceeded to apply the test in reverse order, first reviewing the
historical methods used to recover funds owed to the government,
and then analyzing compatibility of the disputed summary process
with various provisions of the Constitution. In that way, the historical
supra, at 50. But Coke merely meant that the act he was talking about reiterated
existing law, and Coke made this clear in his book’s introduction (which he called a
“proeme”). See id. at Proeme (“[T]he prudent reader may . . . know whether the
statute be introductory of a new law, or declaratory of the old . . . .”) The page in
question is the seventh page of the proeme. Id.
57
See Murray’s Lessee, 59 U.S. at 280 (due process “generally implies and
includes. . .a trial according to some settled course of judicial proceedings”). The
Court may have merely meant that general common law procedural principles apply
unless altered by legislatures. See generally NATHAN DANE, 6 GENERAL ABRIDGMENT AND
DIGEST OF AMERICAN LAW §182 art. 5, 230 (1823) (when “a statute makes an offence,
and is silent as to the mode of trial, it shall be by jury, according to the course of the
common law”).
58
Coke stated that at least one type of statutory innovation would conflict with
Magna Carta’s “law of the land” clause. He wrote that, when a statute delegates
excessive discretion to judges, then the resulting judicial fiats are not “laws” and so
cannot be used to take property consistent with Magna Carta. See COKE, supra note
56, at 51; see also Wayman v. Southard, 23 U.S. 1, 43 (1825) (“important subjects . . .
must be entirely regulated by the legislature”). This non-delegation principle is also
embodied in the clause vesting “all legislative powers” in Congress (and so it is
subsumed in the first prong of Murray’s Lessee).
59
Justice Curtis authored a circuit court opinion in 1852 that relied upon a “law
of the land” clause in a state constitution, to prevent procedural innovation. See
Greene v. Briggs, 10 F. Cas. 1135, 1140 (C.C.D.R.I. 1852) (No. 5,764). That decision
encountered strong opposition, including from Horace Greeley (later a lead author
of the 1860 platform), which may help to explain why Curtis’s Murray’s Lessee opinion
was more restrained. See STUART STREICHLER, JUSTICE CURTIS IN THE CIVIL WAR ERA
102 (2005).
60
The Court said that it must look to ancient “settled usages and modes of
proceeding.” Murray’s Lessee, 59 U.S. at 277. Those “settled usages” included
substantive usages, which the Court examined to determine what corresponding
modes of proceeding were applicable. Id.
61
See G. EDWARD WHITE, HISTORY AND THE CONSTITUTION: COLLECTED ESSAYS 157
(2007).

HYMAN.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

2013]

1/9/2013 2:54 PM

THE DUE PROCESS PLANK

241

review informed the compatibility analysis.
For present purposes, the Murray’s Lessee opinion is not just
important as court precedent, but also as an explanation of what
Republicans thought about due process. There is nothing in the text
or history of the 1860 due process plank that deviates from the nonsubstantive meaning of Murray’s Lessee, Coke, and the Fifth
Amendment.
B. Republican Convention in June 1856
As mentioned, the Murray’s Lessee case was decided unanimously,
and among those signing off on it was Justice John McLean, who was
62
an active politician while serving on the Court. A few months after
Murray’s Lessee was decided, Justice McLean was runner-up to John
Fremont for the 1856 Republican presidential nomination (while
Lincoln was runner-up for the 1856 vice-presidential nomination),
and in that role McLean was particularly relevant to the development
63
of the 1856 Republican platform.
A former Pennsylvania congressman and state court judge
named David Wilmot chaired the platform committee at the 1856
Republican convention in Philadelphia (he had become famous for
introducing the “Wilmot Proviso” in Congress to limit slavery), and
he presented to that convention a plank that would eventually
become the basis for the similar due process plank at the 1860
64
convention.
The plank read as follows in 1856 (this can be
compared to the shorter 1860 plank which is recited above in the
Introduction):
Resolved, That with our Republican fathers we hold it to be a
self-evident truth that all men are endowed with the
inalienable rights to life, liberty, and the pursuit of
happiness, and that the primary object and ulterior designs
of our Federal Government were to secure these rights to
all persons within its exclusive jurisdiction—that as our
Republican fathers, when they had abolished Slavery in all
our National Territory, ordained that no person should be
deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of
law, it becomes our duty to maintain this provision of the
Constitution against all attempts to violate it for the
purpose of establishing Slavery in the Territories of the
62

See FRANCIS WEISENBURGER, THE LIFE OF JOHN MCLEAN: A POLITICIAN ON
UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT 139–52 (1937).
63
See infra note 129.
64
HENRY WILSON, RISE AND FALL OF THE SLAVE POWER IN AMERICA 512 (1884).
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United States by positive legislation, prohibiting its
existence or extension therein. That we deny the authority
of Congress, of a Territorial Legislature, of any individual or
association of individuals, to give legal existence to Slavery
in any Territory of the United States, while the present
65
Constitution shall be maintained.
In addition to Wilmot, the authors of the 1856 due process plank
66
included Ohio Congressman Joshua Giddings. Both Wilmot and
Giddings supported McLean for president in preference to Fremont,
67
who eventually lost the presidential election to James Buchanan.
Among other things, the 1856 platform declared that
Republicans were “opposed to the repeal of the Missouri
Compromise” (this language was eventually removed by the authors
68
of the 1860 platform). By supporting reinstatement of the Missouri
Compromise, Republicans in their 1856 platform suggested a
willingness to allow continuance of slavery in some southern territory,
meaning that they believed federal recognition and regulation of
slavery did not necessarily violate the Due Process Clause. That
compromise had, for example, enabled the territorial government of
69
Arkansas to maintain slavery, and in 1836 Arkansas became a slave

65

Republican National Convention, N.Y. TIMES, June 19, 1856, at 1 (original
emphasis). This was the platform’s second resolution. Some versions used “shall”
instead of “should.” See PORTER & JOHNSON, supra note 1, at 27. The fourth
resolution in 1856 mentioned due process too. Id. See generally infra note 116
(Bingham discussing due process violation in Kansas). Notice the lack of quotation
marks in the 1856 plank, unlike in the 1860 plank.
66
The Republican Platform, NATIONAL ERA, Jan. 1, 1857, at 2. Gideon Welles,
Francis Blair, and John McLean helped write the plank. See JOHN NIVEN, GIDEON
WELLES: LINCOLN’S SECRETARY OF THE NAVY 273 (1973); infra note 129 (McLean).
Giddings said he wrote it. JOSHUA REED GIDDINGS, HISTORY OF THE REBELLION: ITS
AUTHORS AND CAUSES 397–98 (1864). But Giddings sometimes magnified his own
importance. See GIENAPP, supra note 4, at 335. Preston King and David Wilmot were
also influential in writing the platform. Id. at 337. The 1856 plank was not the first
of its kind; in 1852, for example, the fourth plank of the Free Democratic Platform
cited the Due Process Clause in combination with a lack of federal enslavement
power, and concluded that the federal government should stop perpetuating slavery.
See PORTER & JOHNSON, supra note 1, at 18.
67
The Philadelphia Convention, NATIONAL ERA at 102 (June 26, 1856). Other
supporters of McLean over Fremont included John Bingham and Thaddeus Stevens.
See WEISENBURGER, supra note 62, at 150–51.
68
See, e.g., PORTER & JOHNSON, supra note 1, at 27 (preamble of 1856 platform).
The Missouri Compromise barred territorial slavery in the old Louisiana Territory
farther north than Tennessee, except in the planned state of Missouri. See Missouri
Compromise, 3 Stat. 545 (1820).
69
See ORVILLE TAYLOR, NEGRO SLAVERY IN ARKANSAS 23 (1958).
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70

state.
But the 1856 platform also declared that, “it is both the right
and the imperative duty of Congress to prohibit in the Territories
71
those twin relics of barbarism—Polygamy, and Slavery.” This
language was also eventually removed by the authors of the 1860
72
platform.
This 1856 statement in the platform was evidently a
response to the demise of the Missouri Compromise rather than an
expression of constitutional principle, given the same platform’s
support for the Missouri Compromise.
But as we shall see,
Republican opinions in 1856 were not monolithic.
C. Dred Scott Decision in 1857
Chief Justice Roger Taney used due process as part of his
argument forbidding Congress to ban slavery in federal territory in
73
the case of Dred Scott v. Sandford. All justices in that case agreed that
the Bill of Rights applied against the federal government throughout
74
the country, including the territories. Taney wrote the opinion of
the Court, including this oft-quoted sentence:
And an act of Congress which deprives a citizen of the
United States of his liberty or property, merely because he
came himself or brought his property into a particular
Territory of the United States, and who had committed no
offence against the laws, could hardly be dignified with the
75
name of due process of law.
Taney did not spell out the source of his assumption that there had
been “no offence against the laws” (which I call his “no-offense
assumption”), but it is likely that he did not derive it from the Due
Process Clause, given that due process was a relatively small part of
76
his argument. Later in his opinion, Taney made an enumerated
powers argument, inferring from Article IV of the Constitution that,
“[t]he only power conferred [upon Congress over slavery] is the
power coupled with the duty of guarding and protecting the owner in

70

Id. at 46.
See, e.g., PORTER & JOHNSON, supra note 1, at 27 (third resolution of 1856
platform).
72
Id. at 31–33.
73
Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. 393, 450 (1857).
74
See id. at 614–15 (Curtis, J., dissenting). See generally Charles E. Littlefield &
J.B. Henderson, The Insular Cases, 15 HARV. L. REV. 281 (1902).
75
Dred Scott, 60 U.S. at 450.
76
See DEAK NABERS, VICTORY OF LAW 103 (2006).
71
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77

his rights.” That strained inference from Article IV would explain
his no-offense assumption. Alternatively, Taney might have meant
that a valid territorial emancipation law would have to offer
78
compensation to the slave-owner per the Takings Clause. Either
way, Taney’s statement about due process relied upon a conflict
between congressional action and other material in the Constitution,
and the summary paragraph toward the end of his opinion did not
79
broadly construe or even mention the Due Process Clause. Thus,
Taney did not reject the non-substantive Murray’s Lessee test, and the
dissenting justices in Dred Scott would likely have criticized such a
rejection if it had occurred.
The dissenting opinion of Justice Curtis did not employ
substantive due process either. On the contrary, Curtis placed
discretion squarely with Congress:
The purpose and object of the [territories] clause . . . being
to enable Congress to provide a body of municipal law for
the government of the settlers, the allowance or the
prohibition comes within the known and recognized scope
of that purpose and object. . . . Regulations must be
needful; but it is necessarily left to the legislative discretion
to determine whether a law be needful. No other clause of
the Constitution has been referred to at the bar, or has
80
been seen by me, which imposes any restriction.
Curtis was a Whig rather than a Republican, but his Dred Scott dissent
was widely accepted by Republicans, perhaps even more than
81
McLean’s dissent, as the official response to Taney’s opinion. Curtis
personally supported abolition of slavery, but like most Republicans
77

Dred Scott, 60 U.S. at 452. See also DON FEHRENBACHER, THE DRED SCOTT CASE:
ITS SIGNIFICANCE IN AMERICAN LAW & POLITICS 381 (1978) (Taney relied on a
delegation of powers argument distinct from a due process argument).
78
See U.S. CONST. amend V. See also PAUL FINKELMAN, DRED SCOTT V. SANDFORD: A
BRIEF HISTORY WITH DOCUMENTS 40 (1997). I no longer believe that Taney invoked
substantive due process, given that he did not suggest his no-offense assumption was
a consequence of the Due Process Clause. Doubtless, Taney would have employed
substantive due process if he felt that it was a legitimate argument to make. Had
Taney employed that doctrine, then it would be difficult to now avoid concluding
that his opinion (with all the others in the case) demolished the precedent of
Murray’s Lessee by not even mentioning it.
79
See FEHRENBACHER, supra note 77, at 380–81 (the summary paragraph to which
Fehrenbacher refers is the paragraph by Taney that begins, “Now, as we have already
said in an earlier part . . . .”).
80
Dred Scott, 60 U.S at 615–16 (Curtis, J., dissenting). Curtis did discuss due
process, but only to infer from history that Taney was misapplying it to similar facts,
rather than to describe what due process meant. Id. at 624–27.
81
See DON FEHRENBACHER, SLAVERY, LAW, AND POLITICS 214 (1981).
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82

he did not reflexively deny its constitutionality. Curtis’s dissent did
not mention Murray’s Lessee, likely because he believed that no
governmental deprivation of property occurred in the Dred Scott case,
83
which meant that there was no due process requirement.
Justice McLean was the only dissenter in Dred Scott other than
Curtis. McLean’s opinion, like Taney’s opposing opinion, asserted
that the finite power delegated to Congress by Article IV meant that
congressional power over the territories was substantively limited.
While Taney argued that Congress could not institute freedom there,
McLean argued that Congress could not institute slavery there:
[T]here is no power in the Constitution by which Congress
can make either white or black men slaves. In organizing
the Government of a Territory, Congress is limited to
means appropriate to the attainment of the constitutional
object. No powers can be exercised which are prohibited by
the Constitution, or which are contrary to its spirit; so that,
whether the object may be the protection of the persons
and property of purchasers of the public lands, or of
communities who have been annexed to the Union by
conquest or purchase, they are initiatory to the
establishment of State Governments, and no more power
can be claimed or exercised than is necessary to the
attainment of the end. This is the limitation of all the
84
Federal powers.
This was an enumerated powers argument, rather than a substantive
due process argument. McLean’s dissent did not mention Murray’s
Lessee because he did not mention due process at all. No judge in
82

The 1860 GOP platform affirmed the constitutionality of slavery within the
individual states: “the maintenance inviolate of the . . . right of each state, to order
and control its own domestic institutions according to its own judgment exclusively,
is essential. . . .” See PORTER & JOHNSON, supra note 1, at 32. See generally Russell v.
Barney, 21 Fed. Cas. 38, 40 (C.C.N.D. Ill. 1855) (Justice McLean holding that the
Due Process Clause is “not obligatory on the states”).
83
See Dred Scott, 60 U.S. at 625 (Curtis., J., dissenting) (writing that “the status of
slavery must depend on the municipal law”). See also BERNARD SIEGAN, ECONOMIC
LIBERTIES AND THE CONSTITUTION 103 (2006). Taney’s opinion in Dred Scott might
have cited Murray’s Lessee if that earlier decision had been mentioned by the dissents,
or if Taney’s due process discussion had been longer than a single sentence. See DON
FEHRENBACHER, supra note 77, at 678 n.24 (1978).
84
Dred Scott, 60 U.S at 542–43 (McLean, J., dissenting). McLean also said that
Congress had discretion whether or not to prohibit slaves “from becoming settlers”
in an otherwise free territory, and said that it would be satisfactory for Congress to
allow a slave or free territory to remain so, “until the people form a State
Constitution.” Id. McLean had made these arguments before. See, e.g., infra text
accompanying notes 132 and 167.
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Dred Scott relied in any way upon substantive due process.
D. Republican Convention in 1860
By 1860, there were several thousand slaves in the District of
85
Columbia, while fewer than one hundred were counted elsewhere in
86
Once Republicans won the 1860
exclusive federal jurisdictions.
election and had control of the White House and Congress, war
broke out in 1861, and in 1862 Republicans in Congress banned
slavery in the District before proceeding with emancipation
87
everywhere else. Given the Republican desire to eliminate federal
support for slavery in the District of Columbia, the omission of the
District from the 1860 due process plank has added significance, and
shows that they believed slavery in the District was a statutory rather
than constitutional matter.
The 1860 Republican convention was not a homogeneous
meeting of radical abolitionists, and their platform was not intended
for such an audience. The convention was united regarding nonextension of slavery, but divided on abolition where slavery already
88
existed. Radicalism on slavery meant defeat at the polls, and the
moderates sought to contain the radicals while retaining their
89
Historians have disagreed about whether the 1860
support.
platform was a defeat of the radicals over the conservatives, or vice
85

1 FREEDOM: A DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF EMANCIPATION, 1861–1867, at 165 (Ira
Berlin et al. eds., 1982) (“The commissioners awarded compensation for a total of
2,989 slaves.”).
86
The Progress of Population, N.Y. TIMES, May 5, 1861 at 4 (the 1860 Census
counted 3,181 slaves in the District of Columbia, but less than one hundred in the
territories). Of course, those numbers do not address the potential that existed for
future slave population. Nor did the 1860 census apparently count people in the
unorganized territory that would later become Oklahoma, where thousands of
African Americans were enslaved by Native Americans. See, e.g., ARRELL GIBSON, THE
HISTORY OF OKLAHOMA 60 (1984).
87
See Act of Apr. 16, 1862, ch. 54, 12 Stat. 376. Then Congress banned slavery in
the territories, but not in federal forts and dockyards. See Act of July 1, 1862, ch. 119,
12 Stat. 432; FONER, supra note 9, at 203. Then Lincoln declared freedom in rebel
states. See Abraham Lincoln, Proclamation (September 22, 1862), in 6 A COMPILATION
OF THE MESSAGES AND PAPERS OF THE PRESIDENTS 96 (James D. Richardson ed., 1897).
Congress compensated owners in the District, but not in the territories. See CONG.
GLOBE, 37th Cong., 2nd Sess., 2052–54 (May 9, 1862). Compensation for
emancipation of slaves is addressed in the Fourteenth Amendment. See U.S. CONST.
amend XIV, § 4.
88
HENRY HARRISON SMITH, ALL THE REPUBLICAN NATIONAL CONVENTIONS FROM
PHILADELPHIA, JUNE 17, 1856, at 19 (1896) (quoting John Kasson).
89
EDWARD YOUNGER, JOHN A. KASSON: POLITICS AND DIPLOMACY FROM LINCOLN TO
MCKINLEY 94–95 (1955).
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90

versa. Doubtless the truth is different for different planks.
91
The due process plank was not merely a rhetorical flourish or
92
unnecessary argumentation. The subcommittee that wrote the 1860
due process plank included lawyers, judges, and elected officials;
skilled wordsmiths, “men opposed only to the extension of slavery,
93
but also abolitionists.” According to John Hay and John Nicolay,
who were assistants to Abraham Lincoln, the platform of 1860 was
94
Political motivations were very
“framed with remarkable skill.”
much in play, one of which was to inspire northerners who were
reluctant to take an anti-slavery stand unless those northerners were
95
convinced that the Constitution was at least in some way anti-slavery.
David Wilmot attended the 1860 convention, where he
explained: “It is our purpose to restore the Constitution to its original
meaning; to give to it its true interpretation; to read that instrument
96
as our fathers read it. (Applause.)” According to historians, there is
“no evidence that the Fifth Amendment was intended as a
prohibition of the existence of slavery anywhere within the national

90

ERIC FONER, FREE SOIL, FREE LABOR, FREE MEN: THE IDEOLOGY OF THE
REPUBLICAN PARTY BEFORE THE CIVIL WAR 132 (1995).
91
Cf. Allan Nevins, The Constitution, Slavery, and the Territories, in THE GASPAR G.
BACON LECTURES ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES, 1940–1950, at 98
(1953) (noting that “recent scholars” have generally viewed platforms “as windowdressing or stage-scenery”).
92
Cf. Thomas Ewing, Speech of the Hon. Thomas Ewing at Chillicothe, Ohio, THE
WORLD: NEW YORK, Oct. 3, 1860, at 6 (“It seems to be there for no other purpose than
to give opponents [of slavery] advantage in the argument.”). Ewing formerly was a
cabinet secretary, and U.S. Senator. WILLIAM HENRY SMITH, HISTORY OF THE CABINET
OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, FROM PRESIDENT WASHINGTON TO PRESIDENT
COOLIDGE 202 (1925).
93
See YOUNGER, supra note 89, at 102. The subcommittee had five official
members. See SMITH, supra note 88, at 19. They were: William Jessup (chair), a
former state judge in Pennsylvania; Horace Greeley, founder of the New York Tribune;
John Kasson, an Iowa lawyer who later served in Congress; Frederick Tracy, a county
attorney from San Francisco; and Austin Blair, a lawyer, prosecutor, and legislator
who later was Governor of Michigan. Kasson was the lead author. See SMITH, supra
note 88, at 18. Others involved with the subcommittee were Carl Schurz, William
Otto, Gustave Koerner, and Eli Thayer. See YOUNGER, supra note 89, at 404 n.22.
94
JOHN NICOLAY AND JOHN HAY, 2 ABRAHAM LINCOLN: A HISTORY 267 (1909).
Later, Hay served as Secretary of State, and Nicolay served as marshal of the U.S.
Supreme Court.
95
See FONER, supra note 90, at 85.
96
CHARLES GOING, DAVID WILMOT, FREE SOILER: A BIOGRAPHY OF THE GREAT
AUTHOR OF THE WILMOT PROVISO 530 (1924). Likewise, in 1856, Wilmot urged
Pennsylvania Republicans to revere “the Constitution as interpreted by its framers.”
Id. at 482.
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97

jurisdiction.” Only in combination with other clauses, such as the
Territories Clause, could the Due Process Clause contribute to
prohibiting the existence of slavery.
Once Lincoln was nominated, some conservative Republicans
asserted that the due process plank had erroneously denied
98
congressional authority regarding the territories. However, those
conservatives did not go so far as to suggest that the plank’s denial of
congressional authority had been entirely based on due process,
99
much less that the denial applied to the District.
III. WRITING THE PLANK SO AS TO AVOID INTRA-PARTY CONTROVERSY
The Republican platform of 1860 “was unusually successful in
avoiding points of controversy among its followers,” according to Hay
100
and Nicolay.
Diversity of opinion helps to explain why the
constitutionality of slavery in the District was not disputed in the
platform.
A. Abraham Lincoln’s Views
Lincoln’s opinion warrants special attention, given his lead role
in 1860. Directly giving his opinion about the District of Columbia,
he said that slavery there was constitutional, though deplorable. He
put it this way on August 27, 1858:
I do not stand today pledged to the abolition of slavery in
the District of Columbia. . . . I should be exceedingly glad to
see slavery abolished in the District of Columbia. . . . [I]t
would be upon these conditions. First, that the abolition
should be gradual. Second, that it should be on a vote of the
majority of qualified voters in the District, and third, that
101
compensation should be made to unwilling owners.
97

See FONER, supra note 90, at 85.
See Ewing, supra note 92; CONG. GLOBE, 36th Cong., 2nd Sess., 1385 (March 2,
1861) (Rep. Baker). Those speeches by Ewing and Baker suggest that the word
“authority” in the plank meant constitutional power rather than moral authority. Cf.
Manuscript Draft of the Republican National Convention of 1860, Kasson Papers (State
Historical Society of Iowa) (the words “constitutional authority” were shortened to
“authority”).
99
Id.
100
See NICOLAY & HAY, supra note 94, at 267.
101
RICHARD STRINER, FATHER ABRAHAM: LINCOLN’S RELENTLESS STRUGGLE TO END
SLAVERY 79 (2006) (describing a debate between Lincoln and Douglas in Freeport,
Illinois). Gradual abolition typically meant slaves born after a certain date could be
free. Lincoln had worked on this in Congress. See HARLAN HORNER, LINCOLN AND
GREELEY 54 (1954).
98
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Lincoln’s notes written a few weeks later confirm that he had a nonsubstantive understanding of due process with regard to deprivations
of property, and by extension deprivations of liberty:
The Constitution itself impliedly admits that a person may
be deprived of property by “due process of law,” and the
Republicans hold that if there be a law of Congress or
territorial legislature telling the slaveholder in advance that
he shall not bring his slave into the Territory on pain of
forfeiture, and he still will bring him, he will be deprived of
102
his property in such slave by “due process of law.”
His continued public and private statements about the District show
103
He did not
that Lincoln always held to his non-substantive view.
dispute that the Bill of Rights restrained the federal government both
104
inside the states and outside. It appears that the only passage that
anyone has ever relied upon to suggest that Lincoln actually
sympathized with substantive due process is the following from an
1854 speech:
It is said that the slaveholder has the same [political] right
to take his negroes to Kansas that a freeman has to take his
hogs or his horses. This would be true if negroes were
property in the same sense that hogs and horses are. But is
105
this so? It is notoriously not so.
According to Professor Mark Graber, this passage shows Lincoln’s
position was that men had a substantive due process right to take
106
property (like hogs) into territories. But Professor Graber muddles
the distinction between different types of rights. The quoted speech
explicitly distinguished between legal, social, political, natural, and
102

Fragment: Notes for Speeches, 3 THE COLLECTED WORKS OF ABRAHAM LINCOLN 97,
101 (Roy P. Basler ed., 1953). These notes from 1858 were likely not spoken. The
debater who opened set the agenda. THE LINCOLN-DOUGLAS DEBATES xxiv (Davis and
Wilson eds., 2008).
103
See Debate at Quincy, Ill. (Oct. 13, 1858), in 3 THE COLLECTED WORKS OF
ABRAHAM LINCOLN 255 (Roy P. Basler ed., 1953). See also MICHAEL BURLINGAME, 1
ABRAHAM LINCOLN: A LIFE 343 (2008); Letter from Lincoln to John Gilmer (Dec. 15,
1860), in LINCOLN ON RACE AND SLAVERY 212 (Henry Gates ed., 2009). Lincoln
approved emancipation in D.C. See Emancipation in the District—Mr. Lincoln’s
Opinions, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 15, 1862, at 4 (Lincoln declined “vetoing an act of
Congress on other than Constitutional grounds”).
104
See Charles E. Littlefield & J.B. Henderson, The Insular Cases, 15 HARV. L. REV.
281, 283 (1901).
105
Abraham Lincoln, Speech at Springfield, Illinois (Oct. 4, 1854), in 2 THE
COLLECTED WORKS OF ABRAHAM LINCOLN 245 (Roy P. Basler ed., 1953) (brackets in
original). Lincoln was still a Whig. See FONER, supra note 9, at 63, 69 (on October 16,
1854, Lincoln identified himself as “an old Whig”).
106
See GRABER, supra note 3, at 63.
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constitutional rights, without classifying this one as a constitutional
right much less as a substantive due process right. Lincoln covered
107
this same topic repeatedly, and carefully contrasted different types
108
of rights.
Despite hating slavery, he did not believe that
governmental maintenance of slavery necessarily violated due
process. As one author has put it, “Lincoln’s prime directive was how
to rid the nation of slavery without undermining the nation’s system
109
of self-government.”
As in the District of Columbia, slavery was common within the
unorganized tract of federal land that would later become the state of
110
Oklahoma. Lincoln discussed this during an 1854 speech, before he
joined the Republican Party:
[W]e never attempted to prohibit slavery as to it. I wish
particular attention to this. It adjoins the original Missouri
Compromise line, by its northern boundary; and
consequently is part of the country, into which, by
implication, slavery was permitted to go, by that
compromise. . . . In all our struggles to prohibit slavery
within our Mexican acquisitions, we never so much as lifted
a finger to prohibit it, as to this tract. Is not this conclusive
that at all times, we have held the Missouri Compromise as a
sacred thing; even when against ourselves, as well as when

107

Abraham Lincoln, Speech (Oct. 16, 1854), in 2 THE COLLECTED WORKS OF
ABRAHAM LINCOLN 264 (Roy P. Basler ed., 1953) (“I admit this is perfectly logical, if
there is no difference between hogs and negroes.”); Abraham Lincoln, Speech (Oct. 7,
1858), in 3 THE COLLECTED WORKS OF ABRAHAM LINCOLN 226 (Roy P. Basler ed.,
1953) (“That is perfectly logical if the two species of property are alike.”).
108
See, e.g., Abraham Lincoln, Inaugural Address (Mar. 4, 1861), in RICHARD
GILDER AND DANIEL FISH, 6 COMPLETE WORKS OF ABRAHAM LINCOLN 169 (1905)
(disclaiming a “lawful right” to interfere with slavery in southern states though slavery
“is wrong”).
109
Lucas E. Morel, Abraham Lincoln: The Better Angel of Our Nature, 29 J. ABRAHAM
LINCOLN ASS’N 51, 52 (2008). Before the Civil War, Lincoln and most other leading
Republicans understood that slavery inherently deprived people of liberty, in
particular the God-given liberty that the Declaration of Independence had famously
invoked. See ALEXANDER TSESIS, FOR LIBERTY AND EQUALITY: THE LIFE AND TIMES OF THE
DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE 138 (2012). Years later, Lincoln reiterated that
people like himself who “declare for liberty . . . mean for each man to do as he
pleases with himself and the product of his labor . . . .” See FONER, supra note 9, at
276 (describing Lincoln’s 1864 speech at a Sanitary Fair in Baltimore). What
Lincoln said is as important as what he did not say; Lincoln did not claim that the
Due Process Clause declares for liberty, or that “due process” should be redefined, or
that the God-given liberty to do as one pleases with one’s self and the product of
one’s labor is the only liberty worth recognizing. See id.
110
See GIBSON, supra note 86, at 60.
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111

for us?
Lincoln made this Peoria speech shortly after the Kansas-Nebraska
112
Act of May 1854 had virtually nullified the Missouri Compromise,
and he evidently saw nothing unconstitutional about permitting
slavery in the Oklahoma tract, even though he deplored it. Four
years later (by which time the Missouri Compromise had been
attacked in Dred Scott), Lincoln was echoing the 1856 Republican
platform: “I am impliedly, if not expressly, pledged to a belief in the
right and duty of Congress to prohibit slavery in all the United States
113
Territories.”
The part of the 1856 plank that he was echoing was
114
not the due process plank, however, and there is no indication that
Lincoln ever believed he had advocated anything unconstitutional in
his 1854 Peoria speech.
B. John Bingham’s Views
Some Republican leaders of that era did believe that federallymaintained slavery in the District was unconstitutional.
One
particularly relevant example is Ohio Congressman John Bingham,
later the lead author of the Fourteenth Amendment.
Bingham said that the Due Process Clause applied in full force
to protect all persons in the District, but he cited that clause in
combination with other substantive clauses to argue for the
115
unconstitutionality of slavery.
In other words, Bingham was
reasoning just as the United States Supreme Court had instructed in
1856 (“examine the Constitution itself, to see whether this process be
116
in conflict with any of its provisions”).
For example, in 1857, Bingham cited the Due Process Clause in
111

Abraham Lincoln, Speech at Peoria, Illinois (Oct. 16, 1854), in 2 THE COLLECTED
WORKS OF ABRAHAM LINCOLN 258 (Roy P. Basler ed., 1953). The Missouri
Compromise is discussed supra at note 68.
112
Kansas-Nebraska Act of May 30, 1854, ch. 59, 10 Stat. 277.
113
Debate at Freeport, Illinois (Aug. 27, 1858), in 3 THE COLLECTED WORKS OF
ABRAHAM LINCOLN 40 (Roy P. Basler ed., 1953) (emphasis in original).
114
See infra note 162 (quoting third resolution of 1856 platform).
115
See Stephen Halbrook, Second-Class Citizenship and the Second Amendment in the
District of Columbia, 5 GEO. MASON U. C.R. L.J. 105, 131–32, 144–45 (1995) (discussing
various speeches by Bingham).
116
See Den ex dem. Murray v. Hoboken Land & Imp. Co. (Murray’s Lessee), 59
U.S. 272, 277 (1856). In 1856, Bingham decried an act in Kansas Territory that
“abridges freedom of speech” and so he aptly inferred a due process violation. See
CONG. GLOBE, 34TH CONG., 1ST SESS., 124 App. (1856). This matter appears in the
fourth resolution of the 1856 platform. See PORTER & JOHNSON, supra note 1, at 27–
28.
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117

combination with the Titles of Nobility Clause against slavery.
Further, in 1862, he cited the Due Process Clause in combination
118
In the
with the Privileges and Immunities Clause against slavery.
latter speech, he urged legislation to free “all American citizens held to
service or labor within the District,” in preference to legislation
aimed more broadly at freeing “all persons” held as slaves in the
119
District.
In these speeches, Bingham’s interpretation of the Due
Process Clause was orthodox and non-substantive, though he had an
unorthodox interpretation of the Titles of Nobility Clause and the
120
Privileges and Immunities Clause.
As for Bingham’s belief that
governmental maintenance and enforcement of slavery in the District
deprived people of liberty (with or without due process of law), that
belief seems to have been undisputed by Republicans, including
Lincoln.
After the Civil War, Bingham said that the word “law” in the Due
Process Clause means “the perfection of human reason,” but in
context he was seeking more congressional power to perfect state law,
117

See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9 (Title of Nobility Clause); CONG. GLOBE, 34TH CONG.,
3D SESS., 140 App. (1857). Two years later, Bingham criticized an Oregon law that
gave legal aliens the right to vote notwithstanding that the Constitution only allows
citizens to vote; he contrasted that citizenship requirement with the protection that
the Due Process Clause and Takings Clause collectively provide for any “person,” not
merely any “citizen.” See CONG. GLOBE, 35TH CONG., 2D SESS., 982–83 (Feb. 11, 1859).
As usual, he did not cite the Due Process Clause all by itself.
118
U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 2 (Privileges and Immunities Clause); CONG. GLOBE,
37TH CONG., 2D SESS., 1637–39 (1862).
119
CONG. GLOBE, 37TH CONG., 2ND SESS., 1637–39 (1862) (emphasis added).
120
The orthodox view of the Privileges and Immunities Clause was that it did not
limit how a state treats its own citizens. See, e.g., Magill v. Brown, 16 F. Cas. 408, 420
(C.C.E.D. Pa. 1833) (Justice Baldwin called it a “grant by the people of the state in
convention, to the citizens of all the other states of the Union, of the privileges and
immunities of the citizens of this state”). This clause did not protect natural rights
even when those rights were listed in state constitutions, except insofar as such rights
were already enforceable by the state’s own citizens. See generally Robert Natelson,
The Original Meaning of the Privileges and Immunities Clause, 43 GA. L. REV. 1117, 1188
(2009) (noting that “any privileges a state granted to its citizens in vindication of
those [natural] rights had to be extended to visitors”). When a natural right was
enforceable by certain persons, it was often deemed a “privilege.” See 1 WILLIAM
BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 159–61 (1st ed., 1765) (stating
that legislators have “privilege of speech”); 2 JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE
CONSTITUTION § 863 (1833) (same). Vindication of a natural right is deemed a
“privilege” by the Constitution. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9 (Suspension Clause
protects liberty). The last (supplementary) resolution at the 1860 convention cited
violation of the Privileges and Immunities Clause, with regard to men who had been
driven out of their adopted states on account of their opinions. See SMITH supra note
88, at 23; cf. PORTER & JOHNSON, supra note 1, at 33 (the platform did not include this
resolution).
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rather than suggesting the clause gives to the judiciary power to strike
121
enactments that the judges deem imperfect. Bingham believed that
the Due Process Clause applies to any “person,” and that it
consequently applies to rich and poor alike, to weak and strong, to
122
citizen and non-citizen, et cetera.
Instead of following from
substantive due process, this aspect of the clause apparently flows
from its plain text, which does not include any limits as to the type of
“person.”
C. Other Divergent Views About Slavery in District of Columbia
David Wilmot, who presented the 1856 version of the plank to
the Republican convention in Philadelphia, and who also spoke at
the 1860 convention in Chicago, took the position that Congress
possessed discretion to either make slavery legal or illegal in the
District. For example, Wilmot said in 1849 that slavery would “remain
perpetual” in the District absent congressional action, which could be
123
taken or not taken as a matter of “propriety or policy.”
Thus, there were diverging opinions regarding whether
governmental maintenance of slavery in the District was
constitutional; Lincoln and Wilmot were among those who said it was,
while Bingham was among those who said it was not. The differing
opinions of some other leading Republicans of that era are addressed
elsewhere in this Article. That diversity of opinion helps to explain
why slavery in the District was not explicitly discussed in the 1860
platform, though the implication of the platform was that
government-supported slavery was not an inherent due process
violation. For the platform to explicitly discuss slavery in the
territories was unproblematic and unavoidable, given the high profile

121

See CONG. GLOBE, 39TH CONG., 1ST SESS., 1094 (1866). The pending
constitutional amendment said: “Congress shall have power to make all laws which
shall be necessary and proper to secure . . . equal protection in the rights of life,
liberty, and property.” Id. at 806, 813. See generally PHILLIPS, supra note 45, at 7 (using
a definition of civil law as “what the legislature deems right”). See also Abraham
Lincoln, Inaugural Address (Mar. 4, 1861), in 6 RICHARD GILDER AND DANIEL FISH,
COMPLETE WORKS OF ABRAHAM LINCOLN 169 (1905) (“[T]he intention of the lawgiver
is the law.”). Joshua Giddings felt differently, believing that gross injustice is not
law. See Joshua Giddings, Political, Mr. Giddings to Mr. Corwin, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 6,
1859 (“[I]t is no law . . . .”). Giddings likewise wrote: “the murder or enslavement of
the humblest of the human family is not merely unjust, but criminal . . . .” Letter
from Joshua Giddings to Thomas Ewing (Nov. 7, 1860), in GEORGE WASHINGTON
JULIAN, THE LIFE OF JOSHUA R. GIDDINGS 383 (1892).
122
CONG. GLOBE, 37TH CONG., 2ND SESS., 1638 (1862).
123
See GOING & WILMOT, supra note 96, at 336.
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of the Dred Scott case, and given the Republican emphasis on halting
the spread of slavery rather than uprooting it. The 1860 platform
committee’s desire to avoid intra-party controversy was intense, and
so they would have avoided the controversial doctrine of substantive
due process, if indeed they were aware of it, especially because
invoking that doctrine would have pleased only a small minority while
124
stirring up trouble about the status of slavery in the District.
IV. PLANK REFERS TO AREAS WHERE SLAVERY LACKED LEGAL
EXISTENCE
The plank’s omission of the District of Columbia was related to
the District not being “free soil.” In the eighteenth century, the
founders had banned slavery in the then-existing territories, as the
due process plank explicitly recounted, but had not banned slavery in
125
the area of the District of Columbia. Ergo, the 1860 plank did not
oppose slavery in the District, which was not free soil.
The platform’s treatment of the District was addressed in
Congress by Lyman Trumbull, a Republican Senator from Illinois
who would later co-author the great Thirteenth Amendment that
126
banned slavery nationwide.
Trumbull explained in 1859 that the
due process plank of the 1856 platform had not called into question
the constitutionality of slavery in the District of Columbia:
He wanted to know if the slaves are free in the District of
Columbia by this platform. No, sir . . . . There may be
slavery in a country which does not belong to the United
States; the United States may acquire that country, and may
not abolish slavery, because the right to hold slaves existed
when the country was acquired; but it does not follow that if
the country was free when we acquired it, men could
afterwards have property in slaves in it; and that is the
127
distinction.
Statements like this one by Trumbull confirm that no substantive due
process doctrine was actually endorsed or tolerated in either the 1856
or the 1860 versions of the plank.
124

See FONER, supra note 90, at 43. The substantive interpretation of due process
was usually viewed as absurd by antebellum Republicans, although it had a following
within a faction of radical abolitionists. Id.
125
See, e.g., JAN GEISLER, THE CONCEPT OF FREEDOM AND EQUALITY IN THE AMERICAN
CONSTITUTION 68 (2008).
126
See, e.g., HORACE WHITE, THE LIFE OF LYMAN TRUMBULL 221–25 (1913).
127
CONG. GLOBE, 36TH CONG., 1ST SESS., 57–58 (1859). The plank that Trumbull
was discussing can be found in the text accompanying note 65 supra.
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As early as 1847, David Wilmot equated extension of slavery into
free territory with “giving legal existence to slavery,” which is the
128
same phraseology of the 1856 and 1860 planks.
In other words,
maintaining slavery was a different issue from giving slavery existence,
according to people like Wilmot, and the due process plank only
targeted the latter.
Evidently, Trumbull’s and Wilmot’s position paralleled that of
the 1856 Republican presidential candidate (and U.S. Supreme
Court Justice) John McLean, who was deeply involved in developing
129
the 1856 platform.
McLean was familiar with the 1856 platform
130
He had written in 1847 and
committee members and vice versa.
again in 1856 that Congress lacked complete control over territorial
slavery, and that Congress had no power to establish territorial slavery
131
where it did not already exist. But McLean also wrote that Congress
could provide for the administration of justice among the settlers
(and consequently prohibit slavery), and that Congress could also
132
recognize and regulate pre-existing territorial slavery.
McLean
consistently said that Congress had some power to legislate about
133
territorial slavery. In 1856, McLean publicly wrote to Senator Lewis
128

JONATHAN EARLE, JACKSONIAN DEMOCRACY & THE POLITICS OF FREE SOIL, 1824–
1854, at 138 (2004). Wilmot asked in 1847, “[s]hall the government of this Republic,
by the extension of the Missouri Compromise into free territory, give legal existence
to slavery?” Id.
129
The Republicans’ national convention was from June 17–19, 1856. On June
11, McLean outlined a platform. See WEISENBURGER, supra note 62, at 149. He
wanted the Missouri Compromise to be restored, the constitutional rights of both
free and slave states to be preserved, and “no slavery to be instituted into free
territory.” See Reel 11, John McLean papers, Manuscript Division, Library of
Congress, Washington D.C.
130
See GIENAPP, supra note 4, at 337.
131
Id. at 312.
132
See John McLean, Has Congress Power to Institute Slavery?, DAILY NAT’L
INTELLIGENCER, May 15, 1856, at 2. An excerpt follows:
[Congress] may . . . provide for the administration of justice among the
settlers, [but] it does by no means follow that they may establish
slavery. . . . In the Territories of Louisiana and Florida, Congress
recognized, and to a limited extent regulated slavery. But, as before
remarked, slavery existed in those Territories at the time they were
ceded to the United States. . . .
Id. This same essay by McLean had been published anonymously in 1847. Has
Congress Power to Institute Slavery?, DAILY NAT’L INTELLIGENCER, May 22, 1847, at 3. See
also 29 THE FRIEND 306–07 (1856).
133
Cf. FEHRENBACHER, supra note 77, at 143–44. According to Fehrenbacher, by
the time of the Dred Scott case, McLean had altered his earlier view that Congress had
only limited power to legislate concerning territorial slavery, and Fehrenbacher says
McLean’s Dred Scott dissent agreed with an opinion by Chief Justice John Marshall
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Cass that Congress had discretion to either maintain or forbid slavery
in a territory, as long as Congress did not establish it in the first place:
You may recollect that I have, in conversation with you,
often said that Congress, having the power to establish a
Territorial Government, might, in the exercise of a police
power, prohibit slavery, although they had no constitutional
134
power to institute it.
McLean’s position regarding territorial slavery was based upon the
135
This was an enumerated
limited reach of the Territories Clause.
powers argument, not a due process argument.
As to the
constitutionality of slavery in the District of Columbia, McLean wrote
that it had legally existed when the District came under federal
136
control, and, therefore, it never arose as a constitutional issue.
Thus, up until the first Republican national convention in 1856,
McLean’s position about slavery within federal jurisdiction was
consistent over time, and matched Trumbull’s explanation of the
1856 due process plank. For them, the due process plank’s denial of
federal authority “to give legal existence to slavery in any territory of
the United States” was inapplicable to locations where slavery already
had legally existed when those places entered into exclusive federal
137
jurisdiction. McLean’s dissent in Dred Scott took a similar approach.
Another key player was Governor Salmon P. Chase of Ohio.

according to which congressional power over the territories was unquestioned. Id. at
144. But Fehrenbacher missed the mark here; McLean continued to assert in his
Dred Scott opinion that Congress had no power to “make either white or black men
slaves,” and McLean added that Chief Justice Marshall’s opinion to the contrary had
been “inadvertently uttered.” Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. 393, 542 (1857)
(McLean, J., dissenting).
134
Letter from John McLean to Lewis Cass (May 13, 1856), in 29 THE FRIEND 307
(1856) (emphasis in original). Generally speaking, McLean believed that judges and
jurors should follow laws including ones they believe to be wrong. See Giltner v.
Gorham, 10 F. Cas. 424, 432 (C.C.D. Mich. 1848) (“However unjust and impolitic
slavery may be . . . you are sworn to decide this case according to law.”); Jones v. Van
Zandt, 13 F. Cas. 1047, 1048 (C. C. D. Ohio 1843) (“[I]f convictions . . . of what is
right or wrong, are to be substituted as a rule of action in disregard of the law, we
shall soon be without law and protection.”).
135
U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 3 (“Congress shall have power to . . . make all needful
Rules and Regulations respecting the Territory or other Property belonging to the
United States.”). See also McLean, supra note 84 and infra note 167, with
accompanying text (elaborating on his enumerated powers argument).
136
See McLean, supra note 132.
137
Dred Scott, 60 U.S at 542–43 (McLean, J., dissenting) (McLean believed that
Congress could not make anyone into a slave, but Congress had discretion whether
to allow slaves into an otherwise free territory, and Congress could allow a slave
territory or free territory to remain so until statehood).
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Chase was McLean’s son-in-law, and later would be appointed
138
Treasury Secretary and then Chief Justice by Lincoln. Chase said in
June of 1860 that, “[w]e don’t mean to interfere with slavery where it
139
is, but mean to stay it there.”
Chase was under pressure from
Lincoln to backtrack from his earlier, more adamant anti-slavery
140
Those earlier speeches by Chase, in favor of substantive
position.
due process, were more political and tactical than legally convincing,
and the flaws in his reasoning were apparent even in the 1840s and
141
1850s.
Chase’s 1860 retreat from substantive due process later
morphed back into support for it; in passing the Legal Tender Act of
142
1862, Congress committed what Chase would describe in 1871 as a
143
“manifest violation” of substantive due process. Yet in 1862 neither
Chase nor a single member of the Republican-controlled Congress
publicly pointed to any such purported violation of substantive due
144
process.
In the years leading up to the Civil War, Republicans were much
more united behind halting the spread of slavery than in rolling it
back, and their due process plank reflected that policy. Congress
would act (in the words of the platform) “whenever such legislation is
necessary” to prevent slavery from spreading beyond its existing
145
limits.
David Wilmot, for example, was primarily interested in
138

Chase commented about the 1856 GOP platform: “I hardly believe that the
majority understood what broad principles they were avowing.” Letter of Salmon P.
Chase to George W. Julian (July 17, 1856), quoted in WILLIAM GIENAPP, THE ORIGINS
OF THE REPUBLICAN PARTY, 1852–1856, at 337 (1987) (stating that Chase may have
exaggerated those principles).
139
Political, N.Y. DAILY TRIBUNE, June 15, 1860.
140
See Salmon P. Chase, The Address of the Southern and Western Liberty Convention
Held at Cincinnati, June 11 and 12, 1845, ANTI-SLAVERY ADDRESSES OF 1844 AND 1845, at
75, 86 (1867) (stating that due process renders slavery “in any place of exclusive
national jurisdiction, impossible”). Chase’s 1845 position apparently meant slavery
was not only unlawful in the District, but also Congress had illegally admitted slave
states. By 1859, Chase was under pressure to moderate his positions. See Letter from
Abraham Lincoln to Salmon P. Chase (June 20, 1859), in 3 THE COLLECTED WORKS
OF ABRAHAM LINCOLN 386 (Roy P. Basler ed., 1953).
141
See FONER, supra note 90, at 85.
142
Legal Tender Act of 1862, 12 Stat. 345 (1862).
143
See Knox v. Lee, 79 U.S. (1 Wall.) 457, 580 (1871) (Chase, C.J., dissenting).
144
See Ajit v. Pai, Congress and the Constitution: The Legal Tender Act of 1862, 77 OR.
L. REV. 535, 583–84, 588 (1998). Chase helped get the measure passed as Treasury
Secretary, and his own picture appeared on the one dollar bill. See BARBARA ALLMAN,
BANKING 8 (2005).
145
The platform language “whenever such legislation is necessary” has been
characterized as a “loophole.” RICHARD CURRENT, THE LINCOLN NOBODY KNOWS 102
(1963).

HYMAN.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

258

SETON HALL LAW REVIEW

1/9/2013 2:54 PM

[Vol. 43:229

maintaining free territories in a free condition, hoping that the
146
While political
institution might eventually wither elsewhere.
convenience surely influenced how Republican leaders chose the
ingredients of their due process plank, there is little evidence that
political convenience influenced how they defined those ingredients.
The 1860 due process plank began by saying (in the present
tense) that, “the normal condition of all the territory of the United
147
States is that of freedom.”
According to usual usage in 1860, the
word “territory” did not include the entire nation, which is evident
from the due process plank itself, because the “republican fathers”
had not abolished slavery within the states or on other federal
148
properties, like forts and dockyards. Given that narrow usage, it was
widely understood in 1860 that the word “territory” in the due
process plank did not include the District of Columbia, and therefore
149
abolitionists protested omission of the District from the plank. Few
slaves were known to be living in the territories as of 1860, which
meant that freedom was in a sense the normal condition there,
150
whereas slavery in the District had been common for many years.
Republicans chose not to use the 1860 platform to confront slavery in
the District as a matter of legislative policy, much less as a
151
constitutional issue.
Everyone knew that Republicans were
generally against slavery, but the party was seeking to be conciliatory
rather than incendiary, war was not yet inevitable, and accordingly
they chose in 1860 to emphasize halting the spread of slavery rather
than eliminating it nationwide.
146

CONG. GLOBE 29th CONG., 2D SESS., 354 (1847). Wilmot said, of maintaining
slave territories in a slave condition, “I will not change its institutions, then.” See also
CONG. GLOBE 29th CONG., 2ND SESS., App. 315–17 (1847) (Wilmot’s remarks).
147
See PORTER & JOHNSON, supra note 1, at 32. The drafters of the 1860 plank
chose the word “normal,” then replaced it with “constitutional and legal,” and then
restored the word “normal.” See Manuscript Draft of the Republican National Convention
of 1860, Kasson Papers, supra note 98. Cf. Ewing, supra note 92, at 6 (using the word
“normal” in a legal sense).
148
See FONER, supra note 9, at 203.
149
Lincoln distinguished territories from the District. See, e.g., Debate at Freeport,
supra note 113 (Lincoln committed to prohibiting “slavery in all the United States
Territories” but not “slavery in the District of Columbia”). Abolitionists like
Frederick Douglass made that same linguistic distinction too, which is why they
protested omission of the District from the due process plank. See infra note 180. See
generally District of Columbia v. Carter, 409 U.S. 418, 432 (1973) (“Unlike either the
States or Territories, the District is truly sui generis.”).
150
See supra notes 85 and 86 (slave populations in the District and the territories,
respectively).
151
See, e.g., N.Y. DAILY TRIBUNE, supra note 139 and accompanying text (statement
by Chase).
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Republicans rightly regarded slavery as barbaric and execrable,
wherever it existed, but that by no means indicates they viewed it as
an inherent due process violation. On the contrary, the 1860 due
process plank was narrowly tailored to apply only in certain areas
where slavery did not already have legal existence, and where various
other constitutional provisions were applicable against that hated
institution.
V. PLANK IMPLICATES CLAUSES OTHER THAN SUBSTANTIVE DUE
PROCESS
The Due Process Clause was recited in the plank for a reason.
Lawyers in the mid-nineteenth century often sought to establish that
a process was not a “due” process by showing that it violated another
152
part of the Constitution.
In essence, the Due Process Clause
provided a remedy for violation of those other clauses upon which it
depended. Justice Curtis, on behalf of a unanimous Supreme Court,
153
affirmed this kind of argument in Murray’s Lessee v. Hoboken Land. A
154
legal treatise by William Rawle had made a similar point in 1829.
The basic remedy for lack of legal and constitutional authorization
was that executive, judicial, and legislative officials could not deprive
anyone of life, liberty, or property.
A. Substantive Clauses
As a remedial or dependent provision, the Due Process Clause in
the Fifth Amendment operated synergistically with the Territories
Clause’s substantive requirement that all rules and regulations must
be “needful.” People like John Bingham also viewed slavery as a
substantive violation of the Titles of Nobilities Clause and also the
Privileges and Immunities Clause, both of which were operable
155
synergistically with the Due Process Clause.
That kind of remedial or synergistic operation has nothing to do
152

See, e.g., New Facts and Presentation of the Case at 1, Commonwealth v.
Twitchell (1869) (on file with the Yale Law School Rare Book Room). This request
for pardon (submitted to the Governor of Pennsylvania) asserted that a death
warrant is “prohibited by any but a due process of law as in the Fifth Article of that
great Instrument, in view of the guaranteed rights of the Sixth Article”). Id. See
generally Twitchell v. Commonwealth, 74 U.S. (1 Wall.) 321 (1869) (opinion by
Chase, C.J.).
153
59 U.S. (1 How.) 272, 277 (1856).
154
WILLIAM RAWLE, A VIEW OF THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES OF
AMERICA 129 (1970).
155
See CONG. GLOBE, supra notes 117 and 118.
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with substantive due process, because the Due Process Clause by itself
156
could not do anything. While substantive clauses provide that some
governmental action is unlawful, the Due Process Clause describes
157
the consequence: preservation of life, liberty, and property.
Besides the Territories Clause, the Titles of Nobilities Clause,
and the Privileges and Immunities Clause, Justice McLean also
referenced implied powers under the Necessary and Proper Clause as
a reason why Congress lacked power to give legal existence to slavery
158
on free soil. Additionally, in 1828, the Supreme Court had created
some ambiguity about whether Congress might have further power to
regulate the territories under Article IV aside from the power given
159
by the Territories Clause.
That plethora of substantive
constitutional clauses and principles helps to explain why the authors
of the due process plank did not try to explicitly pick out one or
more of them.
The Territories Clause says that Congress may adopt “needful”
160
rules and regulations for the territories. That clause was enough to
provide a basis for asserting in the due process plank that, “we deny
the authority of [C]ongress . . . to give legal existence to slavery in any
territory of the United States.” The due process plank did not
explicitly cite the Territories Clause. However, the plank obviously
161
alluded to it by pointing to the Northwest Ordinance, which
162
Congress had reenacted in 1789 pursuant to the Territories Clause.
156

See generally City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 520 (1997) (distinguishing
“remedial, rather than substantive” law); JAMES SIMEON, CRITICAL ISSUES IN
INTERNATIONAL REFUGEE LAW 208 (2010) (“[T]here is a significant difference
between substantive and remedial law.”).
157
See supra note 30 and accompanying text (quoting the Court in Murray’s
Lessee).
158
See McLean, infra note 167 and accompanying text.
159
See American Ins. Co. v. Canter, 26 U.S. (1 Pet.) 511 (1828) (stating that
Congress can regulate territories “in virtue of the general right of sovereignty, which
exists in the government; or in virtue of that clause which enables Congress to make
all needful rules. . . .”).
160
U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 3 (“Congress shall have power to . . . make all needful
Rules and Regulations respecting the Territory or other Property belonging to the
United States . . . .”).
161
An Ordinance for the Government of the Territory of the United States,
North-West of the River Ohio (1787) 1 Stat. 50 (1789). This law banned territorial
slavery, but only in the eventual states of Ohio, Indiana, Illinois, Michigan,
Wisconsin, and part of Minnesota. See ROGER RANSOM, CONFLICT AND COMPROMISE:
THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF SLAVERY, EMANCIPATION, AND THE AMERICAN CIVIL WAR 24
(1989).
162
The 1856 Republican platform included a sentence immediately after the due
process plank, which again implicitly referred to the Territories Clause:
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So, on its face, the due process plank was not intended to be a
comprehensive enumeration of all relevant constitutional authority.
David Wilmot’s anti-slavery efforts, including his Wilmot Proviso,
had long relied upon the Territories Clause, and the due process
163
plank existed in that context. Since the plank was amply supported
by the Territories Clause (and perhaps other clauses) for its assertion
about the authority of Congress, there was no necessity to cook up
any theory of substantive due process to justify the plank, even if such
a theory had been considered plausible.
164
The broad and comprehensive language of the District Clause
conferred upon Congress more discretion to maintain and support
165
slavery than the Territories Clause conferred. After all, the District
Clause does not require that any regulations be “needful,” and that
fact is consistent with omission of the District from the due process
plank’s denial of congressional authority.
According to one anti-slavery congressman speaking in 1850,
166
“[s]lavery is not a needful rule or regulation.” John McLean, the
1856 Republican presidential candidate and Supreme Court Justice,
took a more nuanced position regarding the limited scope of
congressional power under the Territories Clause:
The power here given is limited to the regulation of the
Resolved: that the Constitution confers upon Congress sovereign
powers over the Territories of the United States for their government;
and that in the exercise of this power, it is both the right and the
imperative duty of Congress to prohibit in the Territories those twin
relics of barbarism—Polygamy, and Slavery.
PORTER & JOHNSON, supra note 1, at 27 (third resolution of 1856 platform). This
“barbarism” plank was omitted from the 1860 platform due partly to concern that its
blunt language might jeopardize Lincoln’s election. BURLINGAME, supra note 103, at
612. Still, the 1860 platform opposed slavery, and called the African slave trade
“execrable.” PORTER & JOHNSON, supra note 1, at 33 (ninth declaration of the 1860
platform).
163
BERNARD SCHWARTZ, A HISTORY OF THE SUPREME COURT 107 (1995).
164
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8 (“The Congress shall have Power . . . To exercise
exclusive Legislation in all cases whatsoever, over . . . the Seat of Government of the
United States . . . .”).
165
See MARK TUSHNET, TAKING THE CONSTITUTION AWAY FROM THE COURTS 17
(2000) (“A lawyer could credibly argue that an ‘exclusive’ power is broader than a
power to make ‘needful’ rules. . . .”). David Wilmot said, of the District Clause in
1849, “[t]here could be no broader or more comprehensive grant of power. . . .”
GOING, supra note 96, at 336.
166
CONG. GLOBE, 31ST CONG., 1ST SESS., App. 231 (1850) (Rep. Sackett). Sackett
became a Republican in 1856 because “its platform embraced the prominent
principles he had always advocated, particularly the abolition of slavery.” GEORGE
BAKER ANDERSON, OUR COUNTY AND ITS PEOPLE: A DESCRIPTIVE AND BIOGRAPHICAL
RECORD OF SARATOGA, NEW YORK 500 (1899).
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property of the Government. . . . [I]mplied powers can only
be exercised in carrying into effect a specific power. . . .
[Congress may] provide for the administration of justice
among the settlers, [but] it does by no means follow that
167
they may establish slavery.
This narrow interpretation of the Territories Clause forbade federal
establishment of slavery, but did not forbid federal maintenance of
168
slavery. The substantive provisions upon which McLean relied did
169
not include the Due Process Clause. McLean’s position is evidently
embodied in the due process plank that was adopted in 1856 when
he sought the party’s presidential nomination.
B. Procedural Clauses
Ohio Congressman Joshua Giddings, a primary author of the
1856 due process plank who was later excluded from the 1860
platform committee, had a procedural understanding of due process:
“[T]rial before a court of competent jurisdiction, by a jury of his
170
peers.”
Indeed, the federal judiciary had long said that the
principle of Magna Carta would be satisfied in the event of judgment
171
by jury. Moreover, the Constitution explicitly guaranteed a jury for
172
both criminal and civil trials.
A pro-slavery government could easily finesse the procedural
problem identified by Giddings, for example by allowing a futile jury
trial in which a slave could vainly attempt to prove that he was not a
173
slave.
Giddings likely saw a jury trial as an opportunity for anti167

McLean, supra note 132, at 2. This is the same enumerated powers argument
that McLean later made in Dred Scott. See supra text accompanying note 84 (quoting
McLean).
168
See FEHRENBACHER, supra note 77, at 143.
169
McLean, supra note 132, at 2.
170
See GEORGE WASHINGTON JULIAN supra note 121, at 383; see also Joshua
Giddings, Mr. Giddings to Gov. Corwin, THE LIBERATOR, Oct. 29, 1858, at 1 (noting
“trial and conviction before some tribunal having jurisdiction of the offense”); see
also, infra note 206 (exclusion of Giddings from 1860 platform committee). Cf. supra,
note 121 (Giddings generally believed that unjust laws are not laws at all).
171
See, e.g., Bonaparte v. Camden & Amboy R.R. Co., 3 F. Cas. 821, 828
(C.C.D.N.J. 1830). Justice Baldwin stated that providing a jury is sufficient but not
necessary to guard the principle of Magna Carta. Id. In 1855, Justice McLean also
likened due process to a jury requirement. See Russell v. Barney, 21 F. Cas. 38, 40
(C.C.N.D. Ill. 1855).
172
See U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2 (jury in criminal cases); U.S. CONST. amend. VII
(jury in civil cases).
173
See Williams, supra note 21, at 475 n.3 (noting that “few . . . challenges would
have succeeded without some substantive limits”). See generally GILDER & FISH, infra
note 178 (Lincoln discussing how to decide if a person is a slave).
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slavery jurors to nullify slavery statutes, and he had already endorsed
jury nullification of statutes designed for catching fugitive slaves in
174
But Lincoln prevented the 1860 platform from
northern states.
175
calling for repeal of any fugitive slave laws, much less calling for jury
nullification, and most Republicans including John McLean deplored
176
jury nullification.
Giddings’ interpretation of “due process” can be added to the
views of Bingham, McLean, and many others to collectively explain
why the due process plank was vague about which provisions of the
Constitution were applicable. The plank’s main message was that the
Due Process Clause (together with fresh Supreme Court precedent)
forbade the federal government from taking any measures to
177
circumvent constitutional prohibitions against pro-slavery laws.
It is possible that some Republicans could have seen the plank’s
recitation of the Due Process Clause as simply a call for procedural
safeguards (such as a jury trial) to ensure that free African-Americans
would not be misidentified and treated as slaves, quite apart from the
plank’s assertion that Congress had no authority to give legal
178
existence to slavery in federal territories. However, there appears to
be no evidence for that interpretation, and there would have been no
reason for the plank to discuss that flavor of due process in the
territories but not in the District of Columbia.
VI. ABOLITIONISTS’ CRITICISMS OF THE 1860 PLATFORM
There is no chance that omission of the District of Columbia
from the 1860 due process plank was accidental, or that it was
misunderstood. The 1860 platform only mentioned the District in a
completely different context (i.e., corruption in the “federal
179
metropolis”).
The plank’s omission of the District was sufficiently obvious that
180
abolitionists like Frederick Douglass quickly seized upon it.
174

See CONG. GLOBE, 31st Cong., 2nd Sess. 15–16 (1850) (Rep. Giddings).
Letter from Abraham Lincoln to Salmon P. Chase (June 20, 1859) in 3
COLLECTED WORKS OF ABRAHAM LINCOLN 386 (Roy P. Basler ed., 1953).
176
See CLAY CONRAD, JURY NULLIFICATION 82–83 (1998).
177
See supra text accompanying note 30 (quoting Murray’s Lessee).
178
In his first inaugural address, Lincoln sought “all the safeguards of liberty
known in civilized and humane jurisprudence” to protect non-slaves from slavery.
GILDER & FISH, supra note 10, at 172. In that speech he did not, however, equate
those safeguards to “due process.” Id.
179
See PORTER & JOHNSON, supra note 1, at 32 (sixth resolution).
180
Douglass protested the omission of the District from the 1856 platform. See
175
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Abolitionist William Lloyd Garrison also criticized that omission from
the 1860 platform:
It will be seen that it takes no issue with the Dred Scott
decision, or with the Fugitive Slave Law, or with slavery as it
exists in the District of Columbia; and, by omission at least,
surrenders its old nonextension of slavery policy, and this
virtually endorses the “popular sovereignty” doctrine of
Stephen Arnold Douglas, so far as admission of new states
181
into the Union is concerned.
Like Douglass, Garrison was one of the country’s foremost
abolitionists, and Garrison analyzed the Constitution as written,
without trying to insert anti-slavery meanings that did not originally
182
exist. Garrison’s colleague, Wendell Phillips, explained that, “[t]he
Constitution will never be amended by persuading men that it does
183
Garrison’s analysis of the 1860 platform
not need amendment.”
was equally realistic, and there were also realistic reasons for the
other omissions that Garrison identified in the 1860 platform.
By saying that neither Congress, nor a territorial legislature, nor
any individuals could give legal existence to slavery, the 1860
platform conspicuously left the United States Supreme Court off that
184
list. Garrison was correct that the 1860 platform did not explicitly
mention the Supreme Court or Dred Scott by name, but the platform
did at least imply that the Dred Scott doctrine was “a dangerous
185
political heresy.” That was more diplomatic than a frontal attack on
the Court.
As for omission of the District from the due process plank, there
was no consensus among Republicans in the 1850s that slavery there
186
was unconstitutional.
The faction that agreed with John Bingham
that it was unconstitutional failed to put a noticeable dent in the
platform. And as a policy matter, Republicans wished to emphasize
FONER, supra note 90, at 80. See also FONER, supra note 8 (Douglass registered the same
objection about the 1860 platform).
181
See Lockwood, supra note 8. See also BURLINGAME, supra note 103, at 612.
182
See MICHAEL VORENBERG, FINAL FREEDOM: THE CIVIL WAR, THE ABOLITION OF
SLAVERY, AND THE THIRTEENTH AMENDMENT 13 (2001).
183
PHILLIPS, supra note 45, at 4. See generally ROBERT COVER, JUSTICE ACCUSED:
ANTISLAVERY AND THE JUDICIAL PROCESS 154–57 (1984) (quoting Garrison’s statement
that, “[t]he important thing is not the words of the bargain, but the bargain itself”).
184
PORTER & JOHNSON, supra note 1, at 32 (eighth resolution). The word
“individuals” in the due process plank could include judges. See generally The Courts at
Bar, 8 GREEN BAG 381 (1896).
185
PORTER & JOHNSON, supra note 1, at 32 (seventh resolution).
186
See, e.g., STRINER, supra note 101, at 79 (Lincoln’s view).
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containment of slavery rather than abolition.
Likewise, Garrison’s criticism about the 1860 platform’s
omission of the Fugitive Slave Act of 1850 did not arise from drafting
187
error.
Lincoln had made clear in 1859 that he objected to
including a plank in the 1860 platform calling for repeal of the
Fugitive Slave Act, predicting that a plank like that would “explode
188
the convention and the party.” Later, in his first inaugural address,
Lincoln urged implementation of the Constitution’s Fugitive Slave
189
Clause, even though he abhorred it.
Mentioning fugitive slaves in
the 1860 plank was considered and rejected.
Another of Garrison’s objections (quoted above) was to the
platform’s silence about popular sovereignty. In 1860, the term
“popular sovereignty” meant leaving the matter of slavery entirely to
190
local control within the federal territories.
Some historians have
contended that the 1860 due process plank was basically urging
congressional elimination of territorial slavery, contingent upon local
191
authorities failing to eliminate it themselves. In that way, Garrison’s
goal would be achieved with a minimum of fuss at the federal level.
Indeed, Republicans in Congress did not feel obliged by the 1860
192
platform to ban territorial slavery. The 1860 platform did mention
popular sovereignty, explicitly accusing Congress of committing
“deception and fraud” by reneging on an implied promise to leave
193
the matter entirely under local control.
Whatever the moral dimensions of letting citizens of the District
decide about emancipation themselves, that was the course
187

Act of Sept. 18, 1850 (“Fugitive Slave Act”), ch. 60, 9 Stat. 462 (1850).
3 COLLECTED WORKS OF ABRAHAM LINCOLN, supra note 175, at 386.
189
GILDER & FISH, supra note 10, at 169.
190
See generally JUNIUS P. RODRIGUEZ, SLAVERY IN THE UNITED STATES 419 (2007).
191
See, e.g., DON FEHRENBACHER, LINCOLN IN TEXT AND CONTEXT 56 (1987).
192
See JETER ISELEY, HORACE GREELEY AND THE REPUBLICAN PARTY 289 (1947). The
platform committee rejected “the requirement that Congress shall positively prohibit
Slavery in every territory whether there be or be not a possibility of its going thither.”
Accordingly, during the waning days of the Buchanan administration, Republicans in
Congress passed bills to organize new territories without banning slavery in them,
because they deemed slavery there unlikely. Id.
193
From the 1860 platform:
That in the recent vetoes by the federal governors of the acts of the
Legislatures of Kansas and Nebraska, prohibiting slavery in those
territories, we find a practical illustration of the boasted democratic
principle of non-intervention and popular sovereignty, embodied in
the Kansas-Nebraska bill, and a demonstration of the deception and
fraud involved therein.
PORTER & JOHNSON, supra note 1 (tenth declaration of platform).
188
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recommended by Abraham Lincoln during debate with Stephen
194
Lincoln’s recommendation was not consistent
Douglas in 1858.
with any alleged consensus among Republicans that federal
protection for slavery violated “substantive due process.”
VII. HORTATORY RATHER THAN MANDATORY LANGUAGE IN THE
PLATFORM
Shortly after the 1856 plank was adopted, radical Republican
George Julian (a once and future Indiana congressman whose fatherin-law was Congressman Joshua Giddings), claimed that some
hortatory language in the 1856 due process plank—about the
“ulterior design” of the Constitution—signified that slavery in the
195
District of Columbia was unconstitutional.
However, that 1856
196
All the
language was removed from the 1860 due process plank.
same, Republicans agreed with Julian that the Constitution, including
197
the Bill of Rights, applied to the District.
But there was still some hortatory language left in the 1860 due
process plank, which used the word “should” instead of “shall,” saying
198
that no person “should” be deprived.
Although the difference
between “shall” and “should” may seem slight, modern scholars credit
the First Congress with “changing the flaccid verb ‘ought’ to ‘shall’”
199
in the Bill of Rights.
It is tempting to criticize the 1860 platform
committee for not repeating the word “shall” that appears in the Fifth
Amendment. Certainly they were not entitled to misuse quotation
marks, but they were entitled to employ the word “should” to indicate
a hortatory rather than mandatory meaning, thereby dispelling any
whiff of substantive due process.

194

STRINER, supra note 101, at 80.
See FONER, supra note 9, at 80. Julian said this in a speech on July 4, 1857 in
Kaysville, Indiana. See GEORGE W. JULIAN, SPEECHES ON POLITICAL QUESTIONS, 1850–
1868, at 146 (1872). He also equated due process with “trial by jury.” Id. at 72, 159.
Julian believed that enforcement of the Due Process Clause “would annihilate our
Fugitive Slave Act,” apparently via jury nullification. Id. at 145. The 1856 plank,
containing the “ulterior design” language, can be seen in the text accompanying
supra note 65.
196
The removal of language in the 1860 due process plank created a storm at the
1860 convention (Giddings was against removal), and that language was partially
restored elsewhere in the platform. See Kasson Papers, supra note 98. See also
BURLINGAME, supra note 103, at 612 (noting that Giddings stormed out).
197
See CURRIE, supra note 7.
198
See PORTER & JOHNSON, supra note 1, at 32 (eighth resolution).
199
LEONARD LEVY, SEASONED JUDGMENTS: THE AMERICAN CONSTITUTION, RIGHTS,
AND HISTORY 272 (1995).
195
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A draft of the 1856 platform used the word “shall,” but that
word was subsequently changed to “should” in that same 1856
201
platform, either by error or design. Perhaps the word “should” was
used in 1856 in recognition that the clause did not compel Congress
to stop slavery that was being conducted privately without any
governmental role or action. After the 1856 convention, platform
committee member Joshua Giddings gave conflicting indications
202
about that word of the platform, but by 1860 no one questioned or
objected to use of the word “should.”
In 1857, Justice Curtis wrote in his Dred Scott dissent that the
issue of needfulness under the Territories Clause was discretionary
rather than mandatory (“it is necessarily left to the legislative
discretion to determine whether a law be needful”). That is an
additional reason why the 1860 convention would have retained
(from 1856) the hortatory rather than mandatory language in the
due process plank.
While Congress should do whatever the Constitution says it shall
do, merely saying that Congress should do something is only an
exhortation, “which Congress could heed if it felt like doing so, or
trample underfoot without the least probability of being restrained by
203
the judges.”
The 1860 convention was evidently unwilling to
associate the word “shall” with an application of “due process” that
204
might potentially have been misconstrued (e.g., substantively).
From start to finish, the word “should” was used instead of
“shall” while drafting the 1860 platform, without any apparent
205
objections from anyone. The use of “should” instead of “shall” was
200

The draft 1856 platform has been preserved. See Platform Adopted by the
Republican Party in convention at Philadelphia, June 17–19, 1856 (unpublished
manuscript) (on file with U.S. Miscellaneous Subjects, Manuscripts and Archives
Division, New York Public Library). Like the final version of the 1856 platform, this
draft did not use any internal quotation marks.
201
Republican National Convention, supra note 65; THE TRIBUNE ALMANAC AND
POLITICAL REGISTER FOR 1857, at 42 (Horace Greeley ed., 1857); THE TRIBUNE
ALMANAC AND POLITICAL REGISTER FOR 1858, at 33 (Horace Greeley ed., 1858).
202
See, e.g., CONG. GLOBE, 34TH CONG., 3D SESS., 79 (Dec. 10, 1856) (Giddings uses
“shall”); GIDDINGS, HISTORY OF THE REBELLION, supra note 66, at 397 (Giddings uses
“shall”); CONG. GLOBE, 35TH CONG., 2D SESS., 345 (Jan. 12, 1859) (Giddings uses
“shall”). Cf. The Republican Platform, supra note 52 (Giddings uses “should”).
203
IRVING BRANT, THE BILL OF RIGHTS 37–38 (1965).
204
See, e.g., Culbert v. Young, 834 F.2d 624, 628 (7th Cir. 1987) (“The word
‘should,’ unlike the words ‘shall,’ ‘will,’ or ‘must,’ is permissive rather than
mandatory.”).
205
The draft 1860 platform has been preserved. See Kasson Papers, supra note 98.
John Kasson was the lead author. See SMITH, supra note 88, at 18.
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certainly not an inadvertent error in 1860. Joshua Giddings was one
of the authors of the 1856 platform, which also used the word
“should,” and Giddings was an influential delegate at the 1860
convention as well, if not a member of the 1860 platform
206
committee.
Like David Wilmot, Giddings was a lawyer. He knew
207
what the Fifth Amendment said, and he always quoted it accurately.
Of course, even if the platform had said “shall” instead of “should,”
still the plank referred to due process in a way that did not challenge
government-supported slavery in the District of Columbia, either
rhetorically, substantively, or otherwise.
Here is a marked-up version of the 1860 plank, to summarize
some of the intricacies described above, including the should/shall
distinction:
That the normal condition of all the territory of the United
States is that of freedom [this refers in present tense to territory
in 1860 that had not yet reached statehood]; That as our
Republican fathers, when they had abolished slavery in all
our national territory [this refers to the Northwest Ordinance reenacted by Congress August 7, 1789 pursuant to the Territories
Clause which the plank did not explicitly mention], ordained that
“[this misplaced quote mark belongs later in the sentence] no
person should [repeating hortatory word from the 1856 platform
instead of the mandatory word in the Fifth Amendment] be
deprived of life, liberty or property, without due process of
law,” [the Fifth Amendment was proposed September 25, 1789 at
which time slavery had been abolished in the Northwest Territory,
but not abolished on other federal property, or in the area that
would become the District of Columbia] it becomes our duty, by
legislation, whenever such legislation is necessary [this
phrase gave Congress flexibility], to maintain this provision of
the Constitution against all attempts to violate it [the Supreme
Court said in 1856 that the Due Process Clause is violated
whenever anyone is deprived of liberty in conflict with another
clause of the Constitution]; and we deny the authority [either
moral or legal] of Congress, of a territorial legislature, or of
any individuals [the 1856 platform had additionally listed any
“association of individuals” which would have clearly included
tribes], to give legal existence to slavery [this excludes areas like
the District of Columbia where slavery already had legal existence]
206

Giddings failed to get onto the 1860 platform committee. GIDDINGS, HISTORY
note 66, at 444–45.
See, e.g., Giddings, supra note 170; CONG. GLOBE, supra note 202 (Jan. 12,

OF THE REBELLION, supra
207

1859).

HYMAN.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

2013]

1/9/2013 2:54 PM

THE DUE PROCESS PLANK

269

in any Territory [this redundantly excludes the District of
208
Columbia] of the United States.
This plank was the result of intensive editing by many Republicans
over the course of four years, from 1856 to 1860.
VIII. CONCLUSION
Ultimately, the barbaric and execrable institution of slavery was
banned nationwide in 1865 by the Thirteenth Amendment, although
209
Congress did not fully implement the ban until 1951.
The
historical record of the political battle against slavery illuminates the
210
meaning of all three of the Civil War amendments.
Of particular
interest here, the Republican Party’s 1860 platform addressed slavery
in a way that illuminates how they understood the concept of due
process.
The 1860 due process plank did not endorse substantive due
process, even though Republicans of that era knew well that slavery
was not compatible with liberty.
Most Republicans thought
government-supported slavery in the District of Columbia was

208

See PORTER & JOHNSON, supra note 1, at 32 (eighth resolution).
U.S. CONST. amend. XIII. Congress finally criminalized all forms of slavery in
1951. See DOUGLAS A. BLACKMON, SLAVERY BY ANOTHER NAME 381 (2008).
210
The Civil War amendments include the Privileges or Immunities Clause. See
U.S. CONST. amend. XIV. Recently, that clause was the basis for the deciding vote to
apply gun rights vis-a-vis the states. See McDonald v. Chicago, 561 U.S. 3025, 3059
(2010) (Thomas, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment) (disclosure:
I wrote an amicus brief). See generally supra note 120 (meaning of “privileges and
immunities” in Art. IV). In contrast to the right at issue in McDonald, a right cannot
plausibly be among the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States if it is
located nowhere else in the Constitution. See Dred Scott, 60 U.S. at 449 (“The powers
of the [federal] Government and the rights and privileges of the citizen are
regulated and plainly defined by the Constitution itself.”); id. at 580 (Curtis, J.,
dissenting) (“[T]he privileges and immunities of general citizenship, derived from
and guaranteed by the Constitution, are to be enjoyed by….citizens of the United
States.”). The Court’s first major opinion about the Privileges or Immunities Clause
took no notice of that consensus in Dred Scott. See In Re Slaughter-House Cases, 83
U.S. 36 (1872). The right at issue in Slaughter-House (to engage in a trade or
profession) was nowhere else in the Constitution, and so the Court correctly
declined to enforce that right. But the Slaughter-House Court went much farther,
eviscerating the clause with help from two bogeymen: (1) that Congress might
“control” states by legislating rights that owe “their existence” not to the Constitution
but merely to federal statutes; and (2) that the Court itself might enforce rights
against the states merely because such non-constitutional rights “existed at the time
of the adoption of this amendment.” See id. at 78–79. Correcting Slaughter-House has
precedent, and perhaps that precedent can inspire adherence. See United States v.
Wong Kim Ark, 169 U.S. 649, 678 (1898) (correcting Slaughter-House Court’s
interpretation of “jurisdiction”).
209
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constitutional, though awful and subject to abolition by Congress,
and even those who thought it was unconstitutional usually relied on
more than just the Due Process Clause standing alone.
The 1860 due process plank made a strong statement about the
rightful authority of Congress, and about the evils of slavery, but it
did not employ substantive due process, did not endorse it, did not
attribute it to the Constitution, and did not sympathize with it. Six
long years later, the Fourteenth Amendment used similar language.
The most obvious purpose of the clause in the Fourteenth
Amendment was to copy the original non-substantive meaning in the
Fifth Amendment, rather than to silently import a relatively new and
analytically different concept that was foreign to the 1860 platform.
The Republicans’ 1860 due process plank reflected common
ground among the various differing opinions at the national
convention, at which virtually no one favored applying due process in
a substantive way. Consistent with that plank, Abraham Lincoln—
along with many others—denied that the Fifth Amendment in and of
itself barred federal maintenance of slavery within exclusively federal
jurisdictions like the District of Columbia.
The plank’s use of due process was essentially remedial or
dependent, rather than substantive. That is, if another provision of
the Constitution were violated by some statute or other governmental
action, then the remedy for that violation would include preservation
of life, liberty, and property. Using this non-substantive principle, the
1860 convention was able to invoke the nation’s fundamental charter
without having to list all of the relevant substantive constitutional
provisions, which were numerous, complex, and disputed.
The due process plank is consistent with the recent conclusion
of Nathan Chapman and Michael McConnell:
Due process was not at all about judicial creation of
fundamental rights outside the reach of legislative
amendment. . . . Fundamentally, it was about securing the
rule of law. It ensured that the executive would not be able
unilaterally to deprive persons within the nation of their
rights of life, liberty, or property except as provided by
211
common law or statute. . . .
211

Nathan Chapman & Michael McConnell, Due Process as Separation of Powers, 121
YALE L.J. 1672, 1807 (2012). I do not entirely agree with all of the conclusions
reached by Chapman and McConnell. For example, Chapman and McConnell write
that due process requires legislatures to enact deprivations only by “general rules for
governance of future behavior.” Id. But people like Alexander Hamilton did not
believe that the principle of due process forbade ex post facto criminal laws, and he
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The antebellum history of due process is an important part of the
larger Fourteenth Amendment puzzle, and the due process plank
confirms how to put some of the pieces of that puzzle together. If
this plank is any indication, the Fourteenth Amendment did not
embody substantive due process any more than the Fifth Amendment
did.

supported an explicit prohibition of ex post facto laws as a security for liberty. See
Williams, supra note 21, at 443. The authors of the Virginia Declaration of Rights
(including Patrick Henry and George Mason) had a similar understanding of due
process. They deleted a clause barring ex post facto deprivations, because they felt
retrospective criminal punishments were sometimes useful, while at the same time
the Virginia Declaration of Rights included the “law of the land” clause from Magna
Carta. See JEFF BROADWATER, GEORGE MASON: FORGOTTEN FOUNDER 85 (2006). There
are nontrivial arguments against the position of Hamilton, Henry, and Mason
regarding due process, but the weight of evidence indicates their position was
prevalent during that era. In England prior to American independence, ex post facto
laws “were never regarded as inconsistent with the law of the land.” Hurtado v.
California, 110 U.S. 516, 531 (1884).

